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Foreword
In the recent 2002 EBRD Transition report, competition policy in
FR Yugoslavia was again evaluated with a bad (least possible) mark.
Progress in transition noted in some other areas has obviously been
missing in the field of competition policy. 
The aim of the CLDS project New Competition Policy for FR
Yugoslavia is to build new competition legislation as a first step
towards the development of competition policy and competition insti-
tutions. The end products of the project are the policy paper that fol-
lows and the draft legislation (Draft Competition Law) that has already
been submitted to the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Economic
Relations. 
The policy paper that follows was developed in an interactive process
that included CLDS team members on the one side, and a number of
foreign competition policy experts, on the other. The key event of this
collaboration was a closed international conference held in Belgrade on
14th and 15th November 2002. We are grateful to all participants of the
Conference for their contributions towards the formulation of the new
competition policy
We are grateful to Nicholas Banasevic, William Baumol, Russell
Damtoft, Itzhak Goldberg, Tim Hughes, Patrick Lindberg, Steve
Pejovich, Russell Pittman, Richard Posner, Anne Purcell, Peter Sanfey,
Jozsef Sarai, Eugene Stuart, Gabor Szoboszlay, Zoran Tomiæ and Maria
Vagliasindi who read early versions of the policy paper and draft legis-
lation and provided very useful comments and suggestions. We are
particularly grateful to Russell Pittman who spent substantial time with
the CLDS team members in putting together the first Draft legislation.
Naturally the usual caveat applies: none of them is to be held responsi-
ble for any possible remaining errors or opinions in the policy paper or
draft legislation. Furthermore it should be understood that their com-
ments and suggestions do not necessarily reflect the views of the insti-
tutions of their affiliation. 
The Project New Competition Policy is a part of the USAID
Economic Policy for Economic Efficiency Project. The EPEE project is
engaged in providing technical and professional assistance aimed at
institutionalizing Serbias economic restructuring process. This work
is key in establishing and enforcing the rule of law in commercial
7
8transactions, thereby creating the incentives for legitimate market
behavior. We are grateful to EPEE personnel for their support. Finally
we are grateful to the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Economic
Relations for their support for this project. 




1. The competition policy in Yugoslavia/Serbia should be compatible
with EU competition policy in broad terms (key competition poli-
cy principles, general legal principles, legal terminology, i.e. EU
legal language etc.), using the same general legal framework, but
nonetheless utilizing some of the other elements of competition
policy (criminal liability, for example) suitable for the domestic
legal and economic environment. 
2. Competition legislation should, up to a point, enable flexibility, i.e.
various types of competition policy to be enforced. On the one
hand, competition policy (particularly in terms of its enforcement)
should be narrower than competition legislation  the legislation
should provide a legal basis for quite a wide range of policies in
terms of their implementation. On the other hand, there should be
some legal constraints (provided by the Competition Law) on com-
petition policy enforcement to minimize the possibility of its abuse
and to reduce uncertainty for the parties involved. 
3. Legal constraints on competition policy and the competition
authority should be substantial, particularly taking into account
that checks and balances other that the legislation itself are not yet
very developed and are unlikely to be developed soon. Some basic
economic freedoms should be protected by the law. 
4. Taking into account the existing market structures and market
practices in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia, as well as the limited resources
available for competition policy enforcement, the priorities (at least
the short-term priorities) of the new competition policy/legislation
should be as follows: (a) to combat and prevent cartels; (b) to
enhance and foster privatization and economic restructuring; (c) to
increase the economic freedom of firms and private entrepreneurs;
(d) to decrease uncertainty to all parties, particularly to firms and
private entrepreneurs; (e) to avoid price control as a mechanism of
competition policy; (f) to influence other polices that have an
impact on market competitiveness, particularly those that create
barriers to entry. 
5. Economic efficiency should be the only aim of competition policy.
All aspects should be taken into account (allocative vs. productive
efficiency and consumer vs. producers welfare). Artificial protec-
tion of inefficient producers (big or small) should be avoided at
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any cost. The first article of the new Competition Law should
explicitly stipulate that economic efficiency is the only aim of
competition policy.
6. As to the segments of competition policy, legislation enforcement
is traditional, inevitable and very resources consuming, i.e. it
inevitably creates a huge administrative burden for the competi-
tion authority. By effective advocacy the competition authority
can influence virtually all the policies that affect competition on
the domestic market. These policies are the first-best policies in
many cases, compared with traditional competition legislation
enforcement. Development of a competition culture, i.e. educa-
tion of all parties concerned regarding competition policy is a
method for making the previous two segments of the competition
policy more effective as the existence of pro-competitive public
option creates the possibility for the competition authority to
recruit many allies. Competition law should provide a legal basis
for the competition authority to have a consultative role in the
case of new policies and legislation and initiating review and
examination of existing policies and legislation relevant for com-
petition policy. 
7. Merger control provisions should be a part the new competition
legislation. There should be a suspension in merger control
enforcement and the whole new legislation enforcement for a spe-
cific time after adoption of the new legislation  12 months from
the legislation enactment. This suspension of the legislation
enforcement will enable the competition authority to prepare for
effective merger control enforcement. 
8. The suspension will enable the relatively smooth introduction of
merger control in the privatization process by changing the privati-
zation sub-statutory text (Decree), creating obligations for buyers
of the state owned companies. All the participants in the privatiza-
tion process (buyers) should obtain clearance (if necessary, i.e. if
they are above the notification threshold) before signing the priva-
tization contract in the case of both tenders and auctions. The bur-
den of obtaining the clearance should be on the buyers; hence all
information relevant for merger should be presented to them (i.e.
to the public) in the early stages of privatization. 
9. Prior authorization of mergers as a method of merger control is
based on compulsory pre-merger notification with two stages of
decision-making and is a reasonable option. All firms liable to noti-
fication requirement (above the notification threshold) must sub-
mit the notification to the competition authority asking for clear-
ance of the planned merger. There should be standardized informa-
tion that will be required from the parties  the best way of enforce-
ment will be a standardized form of pre-merger notification request
that should be filled in by all the parties notifying their merger. The
competition authority in short time (30 days) should decide about
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further action: a) there is no action so the merger is cleared; or b)
there will be further investigation after which the merger can be
cleared, conditionally cleared or prohibited. The final decision must
be reached within 90 days from the beginning of the further investi-
gation. Mergers below the specified threshold are not subject to the
competition law, i.e. they are not under the jurisdiction of the law,
and hence these mergers cannot be challenged. 
10. The standard merger notification threshold for all industries and
types of mergers (horizontal, vertical and conglomerates) is to be
established. The thresholds should be objective, so turnover data
should be used as threshold, both (cumulative) minimum com-
bined turnover of the firms that will merge and minimum turnover
of one of the firms. Combined turnover of the merging firms and
minimum turnover of one of them are both necessary conditions.
The merging firms are liable to compulsory notification only if
both conditions are met simultaneously.
11. The legal standard for challenging the mergers is the rule of reason
for all mergers and there should be no differentiation between hor-
izontal and vertical mergers. The burden of proof should be on the
competition authority, i.e. the authority will have to demonstrate
that the merger effects are adverse to competition and consumers
economic welfare in each case. Accordingly, all mergers should be
presumed to be pro-competitive, and the job of the competition
authority is to demonstrate that they are not, if the authority
decides to challenge a merger. 
12. The dominance test should be used as the standard/criterion for
merger evaluation, i.e. examination of the impact of the merger on
economic efficiency and economic welfare. The criterion is to be
applied so as to enable evaluation of the impact that the merger will
have on overall economic efficiency (both allocative and production
efficiency). There should be strict guidelines for the ruling (struc-
tured rule of reason), i.e. the decision-making process should be
strictly defined rather than the outcome. Sub-statutory texts should
precisely specify the procedures for applying the dominance test. 
13. Apart form merger control, competition policy/authority should
address the creation of non-competitive market structures, but only
by firms that have already secured dominant position on the market.
Exclusionary behavior by firms should be treated only as a specific
abuse of the dominant position of the firm. There should be no legal
provision for compulsory divestiture, expect in the case of the sanc-
tions for the failure to notify mergers or failure to notify accurately. 
14. Restrictive agreements should be treated differently. There are
three groups of restrictive agreements. 
15. H1 group of agreements. These agreements are hard-core anti-com-
petitive horizontal agreements (cartel agreements). They should be
per se prohibited, clearly specified in the law by exhaustive list
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(numerus clausus) and should  should give rise to both imposition of
fines and criminal prosecution. Only three types of agreement
should be encompassed by this group: price fixing (including bid rig-
ging), market division and agreements on maximum output. There
will be no exclusions (clearance), no exemptions and no de minimis
rule in the case of these agreements. The competition authority
should only be involved in fact finding, not in considering the conse-
quences since these agreements are per se prohibited. 
16. H2 group of agreements. This group consists of all other horizontal
agreements not belonging to the H1 group. They should not be per
se prohibited, but the rule of reason should be applied. Detailed
guidelines for the rule of reason procedure should be specified in a
sub-statutory text. The competition law could provide only a non-
exhaustive list (indicative enumeration, i.e. exampli causa) of the
agreements and these agreements if proclaimed to be illegal should
give rise only to imposition of fines. There will be exclusions (clear-
ance), exemptions and de minimis rule in the case of these agree-
ments. The competition authority should consider the conse-
quences of these agreements since they are not per se prohibited.
H2 group of horizontal agreements should be presumed to be pro-
competitive. The burden of proof should rest with the competition
authority. 
17. V group of agreements. This group consists of all vertical agree-
ments. They should not be per se prohibited, but the rule of reason
should be applied. Effectively, no vertical agreement should be per
se prohibited. Detailed guidelines for the rule of reason procedure
should be specified in a sub-statutory text. The competition law
could provide only a non-exhaustive list (indicative enumeration,
i.e. exampli causa) of the agreements and these agreements if pro-
claimed to be illegal should give rise only to imposition of fines.
There will be exclusions (clearance), exemptions and de minimis
rule. In the case of these agreements  de minimis rule should be
emphasized. The competition authority should consider the conse-
quences of these agreements since they are not per se prohibited. All
the vertical agreements should be presumed to be pro-competitive.
According to a presumption of that kind, the burden of proof
should rest with the competition authority. 
18. Only voluntary notification of the agreement is stipulated. The
competition authority should be legally obliged to respond to the
agreement notification within 60 days. Special care should be taken
to safeguard against potential abuse of the right to notification for
companies that already have enforced the agreement. 
19. Relevant market definition should be based on the three basic ele-
ments: (a) product market (inter-changeability of products, i.e.
demand substitutability); (b) geographic market (transportation
and transaction costs magnitude/share); and (c) import compo-
nent (imports onto the domestic market should be calculated as a
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part of that market). Supply substitutability should not be a part of
market definition, but should be included in the more complex
procedure of identification of market dominance. 
20. Dominant position definition is based on 40% market share taken
as a prerequisite (necessary condition) of dominant position, i.e.
no firm whose market share is less than the specified one can be
classified as having dominant position. Accordingly, market share
of 40% is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for establishing
that a firm has dominant position. If the market share of the firms
exceeds the specified (40%), other criteria are to be applied for
determining market power, i.e. dominant position of the firm: bar-
riers to entry (scale, character and durability), potential competi-
tion (domestic or international), i.e. supply-side substitutability,
and potential countervailing strength of buyers, as well as other rel-
evant features of the market/market power. 
21. Only the abuse of this dominance should be prohibited, not the
dominant position as such. Accordingly, the competition authority
should monitor the behavior of the firms with dominant position
more closely that they do the behavior of all other companies.
There should be no formal monitoring (i.e. no legal obligation for
the competition authority to monitor dominant firms behavior),
nor a list (register) of firms with dominant position.
22. Both exploitative abuse (i.e. earning economic profit in the short-
run) and exclusionary abuse (i.e. strengthening and further devel-
oping dominant position to increase market power and to earn big-
ger economic profit in the long-run) should be explicitly separated
in the legislation, i.e. separate legal definition of the abuse of domi-
nant position aimed at the appropriation of short-term profit, on
the one hand, and aimed at the creation of non-competitive market
structures, on the other. 
23. There should be two separate lists of indicative enumeration of the
abuses of dominant position (non-exhausting lists, i.e. exampli
causa) leaving room for prohibition of other types of abuse of dom-
inant position. The indicative enumeration in the case of exploita-
tive abuse should consist only of: (a) pricing that is not cost based;
and (b) reducing output. The indicative numeration in the case of
exclusionary abuse should consist of: (a) pricing that is not cost
based; (b) creation of barrier to entry (c) price and other discrimi-
nation; (d) tie-in sales. 
24. In the enforcement of the Law, the competition authority should
focus on the exclusionary abuse of dominant position, rather than
exploitative. That will prevent the competition authority becoming a
price control authority as has happened in many cases in the CEE
countries with numerous bad effects. The legal standard for chal-
lenging abuses of dominant position is always the rule of reason. The
burden of proof is with the competition authority, i.e. the authority
must prove that the party has abused its dominant position and the
13Executive summary
adverse, anti-competitive effects, i.e. adverse effects to economic effi-
ciency and welfare resulting. 
25. The new Competition Law shell be a self-standing competition
law. An enquiry should be made into the urgency of amendment
of the existing Fair Trading Law along the lines of the draft of the
new Competition Law, even to the extent of drafting a new Fair
Trading Law. 
26. Natural monopolies should be regulated according to special legis-
lation (lex specialis) for industries considered to be natural monop-
olies. These pieces of legislation will provide the legal framework
for economic regulation, particularly regarding the methods of
economic regulation and institutions (authorities) that will enforce
economic regulation. Such a solution will be quite consistent with
competition legislation/policy in terms of the economic basis of
economic regulation. For example, economic regulation will enable
pricing in these industries to be cost based, hence no abuse of the
dominant position of that kind will occur. Furthermore, competi-
tion legislation will be enforced by the competition authority in all
other activities of natural monopolies, i.e. operators in these indus-
tries that are not covered by special legislation. Natural monopolies
(regulated industries) should be exempted from some provisions of
the competition legislation by special laws (lex specialis), applying
the principle: one industry  one special law. 
27. The new Competition Law should not have provisions for control of
state aid. Possible future changes in the competition legislation will
depend on the independent development of state aid control legisla-
tion and relations between state aid control and competition policy. 
28. There should be no special provision in the competition legislation
regarding public companies (enterprises), nor should they be
exempted from the competition legislation, i.e. public enterprises
should be subject to the competition legislation. 
29. The only exemption mechanism should be special legislation (lex
specialis) by which some industries (i.e. companies in these indus-
tries) will be exempted from some provisions of the competition
law. It is very important that special legislation should exempt these
industries/companies from only some provisions of the competi-
tion legislation, not entire exemption from the competition legisla-
tion. The activities of the companies that are exempt from some
provisions of the competition legislation should only be those that
are regulated by the special law whose provisions are enforced by
authorities other that the competition authority. 
30. All legal entities, their associations as well as individuals and their
associations directly or indirectly involved in commercial activities
or activities that have an impact on commercial activities should be
subject to the competition law. The Serbian legal doctrine allow-
ing the prosecution of the executives of legal entities in criminal
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proceedings should be taken into account. The state should be sub-
ject to the competition law as far as it is directly or indirectly
involved in commercial activities. Nonetheless, the state should not
be subject to the competition law in its capacity as regulator, i.e.
activities of creation and enforcement of the rules
31. There should be a legal provision that foreign undertakings (compa-
nies) are subject to the domestic competition law so far as their
activities on the domestic market are concerned (Effects doctrine). 
32. Due to the possibility of legal controversy, two sectors should be
explicitly exempted/excluded from competition legislation: (a)
trade unions, in their activities regarding the collective bargaining
process; (b) sports association in their activities of organizing ath-
letic competition. Both exemptions should be specified in the
exhaustive list (numerus clausus) as a paragraph of the Competition
Law itself. 
33. Sanction of the new Competition Law should encompass: (a)
remedies  ordering the end to the illegal conduct; (b)civil sanction
 proclaiming agreement null and void; and prohibition of future
abuse (i.e. the same conduct or different conduct with a similar
effect); (c) fines to all the subjects of the competition law; (d) crim-
inal liability/sanctions for company officials in the case of the most
severe breaches of competition law, only in the case of per se pro-
hibited H1 agreements  all company officials breaching the law
should be liable to criminal sanctions, not only chief executives. 
34. As to the settlement issue, very serious breaches of competition
law should generally always be pursued more officially (i.e. with
official decisions and sanctions) as a point of principle, and to
create a precedent/example, particularly in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia
where competition policy is young, and a useful deterrent effect
on others is to be expected. Accordingly, the settlement policy
should not be abused, i.e. there must be enough cases pursued
officially. The competition authority should have the discre-
tionary right to decide in which cases a settlement can be a useful
way to conclude the case. Nonetheless, the monitoring of the use
of that right is essential, 
35. As to the leniency issue, it is important to enable all company offi-
cials (individuals) involved in breaching competition policy to be
prosecuted for criminal liability. Leniency should also be offered to
legal entities (corporate leniency). An efficient leniency policy can
provide incentives for both individuals and legal entities to turn
themselves in and to provide precious insider information, i.e. tes-
timony regarding the criminal offenses and breaches of competi-
tion law they were involved in. 
36. A strong deterrent effect is essential for general prevention in the
field of competition policy legislation. There are a few cornerstones
for building the strong deterrent effect of the sanctions. There
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should be stringent criminal liability/punishment for company
executives only in the case of H1 horizontal agreements, i.e. most
hard-core abuses. The other crucial cornerstone in building the
strong deterrent effect is severe fines for companies (undertakings).
The deterrent effect can be more convincing if the first convictions
are those of big and powerful firms. Increased probability of con-
victions in both civil and criminal cases, i.e. an efficient competi-
tion authority and courts, is a prerequisite for a strong deterrent
effect. A crucial factor in the probability of conviction is the proba-
bility that breaches of the competition legislation will be detected. 
37. The competition authority operations should be free (independ-
ent) from the influence of politics, partisan politics and public
choice pressures on government. Accordingly, the proposed com-
petition authority should be an independent authority; i.e. a body
independent from the government. Its operations should be moni-
tored by the National Parliament and the public. Responsibilities
(obligations) of the competition authority towards the Parliament
and the public (annual reports, public hearings, etc.) should be
specified in the Competition Law. 
38. The competition authority should comprise three branches (sec-
tors) with difference tasks/operations:
 Competition authority General Secretariat;
 Competition authority Office;
 Competition authority Commission. 
39. The competition authority should be under the control of the
President of the Competition authority who (as well as General
Secretariat) will not be directly involved in law enforcement, but
will monitor all the activities of the competition authority (includ-
ing law enforcement). Furthermore, President and general secre-
tariat will be directly involved in the activities of advocacy and edu-
cation (competition culture). The President will be elected
(appointed) by the Parliament, and will be in charge of competi-
tion authority operations overall. 
40. The competition authority Office will be an investigative body
(quasi-prosecution) that will file cases of breaches of the competi-
tion law. The Office will be under the operational control of the Vice
President of the competition authority and the head of the Office. It
will have the right to initiate investigations ex officio, or to process
complaints filed by third parties. All cases will be filed to the compe-
tition authority Commission. The Vice President and the head of
the Office will also be elected (appointed) by the Parliament. 
41. The competition authority Commission will be a decision-making body
(quasi-judicial body) that will make decisions on the cases of breach in
the competition law filed by the Office. The Commission will be under
the operational control of the other Vice President of the competition
authority and the head of the Commission (Chief Commissioner). The
Commission will comprise seven members: a Chief Commissioner and
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six Commissioners. Decisions should be reached by majority voting of
all seven Commissioners. 
42. The President of the Competition Authority, two Vice Presidents
and all Commissioners should be elected/appointed by the
Parliament for a fixed term. The president should be appointed for
six years, a vice president in charge of the Office for five years and
the Vice president in charge of the Commission (chief commis-
sioner) for seven years. All commissioners should be appointed for
a fixed term, but the term should be different for each commission-
er, staring with two years ending with seven years (Chief
Commissioner). There should be a statutory limit for each official
of one consecutive term in the authority. All of them should be
nominated to the parliament by the Government, i.e. by the
Cabinet of Ministers. 
43. The procedure for dismissal (removing from office) should be
specified very precisely and an exhaustive list of reasons for dis-
missal should be specified by the Competition Law. The list should
include the things (deeds) detrimental to the reputation of the
competition authority (office or commission), such as serious
criminal offenses by official, but should not offer any legal grounds
whatsoever for dismissal due to the specific decision of the
Commission. 
44. The legal powers of the competition authority should be divided
into the legal powers of the competition authority Office and the
legal powers of the competition authority Commission. It is
extremely important that the Office should have the legal power to
collecting all relevant data/information from the subjects of the
law, irrespective of whether the case has been triggered ex officio or
by the complaint of a private party. However, the Office must be
legally obliged to respect the confidentiality of the data collected in
this way. Furthermore, all relevant government institutions (for
example Statistical Office, Security Exchange Commission, etc.)
must be legally obliged to provide all relevant data and information
to the authority. 
45. The Commission should be empowered to order cessation of
infringing activities, proclaim infringing agreements null and void
and to impose fines. As to the general secretariat, there should be a
legal provision that will provide a legal power for the secretariat to
be involved in consultations in preparations of all new policies and
legislation. Furthermore, general secretariat should have the legal
power to initiate review of any existing policy and legislation rele-
vant for competition policy. Nonetheless, the general secretariat
should not have any power to veto any other policy/legislation
however relevant it is for competition policy. 
46. There should be two types of procedural rules of the competition
authority: (a) procedural rules strictu senso; and (b) substantive
rules. Procedural rules strictu senso shall specify precisely all the
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procedures that will be used in all the cases and segments of the
decision-making process within the competition authority. These
procedures should be formal/written to minimize room for abuse
of competition legislation enforcement. The substantive rules
should provide basic criteria for competition authority decision
making. These criteria should enable clear and unambiguous deci-
sions on issues such as what a relevant market is, whether a legal
entity has a dominant position, whether the abuse of the dominant
position is exploitative or exclusionary, etc. 
47. Both types of rules should be specified in sub-statutory texts
(decrees, bylaws, guidelines, etc.), according to the legal provision
provided in the statutory text  the Competition Law. All the rules
should be made public; published in the Official Gazette before
becoming effective and being available from the competition
authority at any time free of charge in both printed and electronic
versions. 
48. The competition authority provides information to the public
regarding its legislation enforcement activities. That should
include: (a) Publishing all the decisions in the Official Gazette; (b)
Create a website with all relevant legislative texts (statutory and
sub-statutory) and all other legal documents; (c) Provide accurate
website information on the status of all cases; (d) Provide website
information on the competition authority (commission) decisions
on all cases; (e) Guidelines for the notification (with forms) for
mergers and agreements; (f) Guidelines for filing complaints
(cases) with the competition authority (office). 
49. The decision-making process should be public in certain instances.
Formal decision-making sessions of the Commission of the compe-
tition authority (as a quasi-judicial body) should be public. The
public should have an opportunity to monitor and contribute to
the decision-making process in which each party concerned should
have the right to make its case (for example, the office as quasi-
prosecutor and the party that is prosecuted). Transcripts from all
the sessions should be available in electronic form. Special atten-
tion should be made to protect confidential data (legitimate busi-
ness secrets) of the concerned parties. 
50. The role of the judiciary in enforcement of competition legisla-
tion is basically divided in to two roles (1) the role of the special-
ized (commercial) courts in the process of judicial review; (2) the
role of general courts in criminal prosecution. In both cases insti-
tutional structures exist, the only short-term improvement that
can be expected is linked to training of the judges both regarding
the basics of competition policy and regarding the recent devel-
opments in competition policy/legislation, i.e. to enable them to
enforce this legislation efficiently. 
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New Competition Policy: A Policy Paper 
1. ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE NEW COMPETITION POLICY IS TO
BE ESTABLISHED
There are four pillars of the environment in which the new competi-
tion policy for FR Yugoslavia/Serbia will be established. 
1.1. Accession to the WTO and the path/pace of foreign trade
liberalization
The new competition legislation/policy must be consistent, in gener-
al terms, with World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements.
Nonetheless, there are no strict WTO requirements regarding competi-
tion legislation and policy. There are only a few specific requirements,
limited to certain areas and/or industries (trade in services, intellectual
property rights, telecommunication policies etc.). These requirements
basically constitute the obligation of a WTO member country not to
violate a number of provisions of agreements signed and ratified as a
part of WTO accession/membership. Accordingly, there are some spe-
cific restrictions regarding the enforcement of competition policy of a
WTO member, not restrictions regarding the general concept of com-
petition policy and competition legislation. In other words, there are
no constraints for the formulation of new competition policy and leg-
islation stemming from the WTO accession process of FR Yugoslavia
(Serbia & Montenegro). 
Nonetheless, a very important result of accession to and eventual
membership of the WTO is the expected acceleration of foreign trade
liberalization. Although substantial foreign trade liberalization of FR
Yugoslavia happened at the end of 2000 and in the first half of 2001
(decreasing tariff rates and simplification of their structure as well as
removal of non-tariff import barriers), tariff protection is still substan-
tial (average non-weighted tariff rate is 9.2%), hampering import com-
petition in many industries. 
As to the path/pace of future foreign trade liberalization, there are at
least two possibilities (scenarios):
a. Scenario A: Strong and fast liberalization of foreign trade and
adoption of the comprehensive FTAs; commitment of both Serbia
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and Montenegro to the process  generating competition from
import, decreasing barriers to entry to the domestic market and
making the value of an aggressive domestic competition policy
rather limited. 
b. Scenario B: Sluggish and delayed liberalization of foreign trade
and huge barriers to entry to the domestic market. That would
inevitably limit the effects of import competition on the domestic
market. Accordingly there would be a substantial need for a rather
aggressive domestic competition policy. 
Currently Scenario B is the more probable, particularly because no
substantial driving force for foreign trade/import liberalization can be
seen at this moment. It is highly probable that in next three to five years
there will be no substantial liberalization of foreign trade. WTO acces-
sion/membership will inevitably foster foreign trade liberalization, but
it is not quite certain what the political relevance/value of WTO acces-
sion would be on the domestic political market.
Recommendation: Competition legislation (Competition Law)
should provide a legal basis to accommodate competition policies of
various levels of intensity; at least for both aggressive and conservative
competition policy: the choice between them will be dictated by the
actual pace of foreign trade liberalization. Furthermore, competition
policy, particularly in the field of controlling and preventing vertical
restraints (foreclosure) is very important for foreign trade (import) lib-
eralization to materialize, i.e. to enable foreign trade liberalization to
generate import-based competition. Substantial foreclosure could be a
relevant import barrier, at least in the short-term. Because of this
short-term effect, competition policy formulation and enforcement
should not be delayed, otherwise the full benefits to import liberaliza-
tion will not be fully felt.  
1.2. Stabilization and association process with the EU and the
long-term prospect for EU accession 
The stabilization and accession process (SAP) with the EU and the
prospects for EU accession are relevant for domestic competition poli-
cy/legislation for at least two reasons. The first one is the path/pace of
foreign trade liberalization, because the foreign trade regime and poli-
cy of the country must be consistent with the EU foreign trade regime
and policy and at some point the domestic market will become a part
of a single market of the EU. That will effectively strongly liberalize the
foreign trade regime and generate import competition from the other
EU countries (no trade barriers on the single market) as well as
decreased import barriers for the import based competition from other
(non-EU) countries. Accordingly, the swifter the accession to the EU,
the smaller the need for stringent enforcement of domestic competi-
tion policy/legislation because a lot of competition will be generated by
imports from EU countries. The second reason is the EU institutional
framework for domestic competition policy that will be imposed on FR
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Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) in the SAP and accession process
toward the EU. Regarding the second aspect of the SAP, there are a few
feasible options for competition policy. 
a. Option A: Development of strictly EU compatible competition
policy  the greatest value will arise if FR Yugoslavia (Serbia &
Montenegro) adheres as quickly as possible to the basic principles
and mechanisms of the EUs competition policy. One can argue
about whether the EU or the US has a better competition policy,
but both systems are more and less grounded according to the
same fundamental, basic principles of competition. Given that in
reality, it is the EU system to which FR Yugoslavia (Serbia &
Montenegro) will eventually have to adhere (and already de facto
in the context of a Stabilization and Association Process), it is
much simpler if it adopts as many of these principles and mecha-
nisms as soon as possible. 
b. Option B: Developing our own path of domestic competition pol-
icy, taking into account primarily the American solutions. Due to
the difference of legal system, American style competition policy
can be applied only in terms of basic principles. One could argue
that American style aggressive competition policy is more suitable
for FR Yugoslavia, due to the inherited highly non-competitive
market structures. 
c. Option C: Developing domestic competition policy that is com-
patible with the EU competition policy in broader terms (key com-
petition policy principles, general legal principles, legal terminolo-
gy, i.e. the EU legal language etc.), using the same general legal
framework, but still utilizing some of the elements of the US com-
petition policy (criminal liability, for example) suitable for the
domestic legal and market environment, and some elements that
will be the product of creative thinking taking into account some
specific features of the domestic legal and market environment. 
Taking all pros and cons into account, Option C is looking rather
good. The Option C is the best way out of this conceptual dilemma.
There are some additional arguments in favor of Option C: (a) FR
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) will not join the EU for at least next
10 years, so there is substantial room (time) for fine tuning of the legisla-
tion to make it completely compatible with acquies communitaire. (b)
EU general principles of the competition policy/legislation does not
exclude some creativity in their implementation, i.e. in the creation of a
specific national piece of legislation; in such a way some drawbacks of the
EU competition policy can be evaded, particularly taking into account
specific conditions in FR Yugoslavia (Serbia). (c) There is general con-
vergence of the US and EU competition policy and the differences
between the two are mainly due to the difference of the legal system, not
so much due to the different concepts of the competition policy. 
Furthermore, the full accession to the EU cannot be expected in next
10 years, so there should be some trade-offs regarding short-term and
long-term solutions. Accordingly, some of the short-term solutions
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regarding competition policy should not necessarily be EU compatible,
if there are some strong domestic reasons to use these solutions. Since
these solutions will inevitably be abolished/replaced by strictly EU
compatible solutions in the long-run (as the country moves towards
full membership of the EU), the scope for theses solutions is somewhat
limited, otherwise too much work will have to be done in the future. 
Recommendation: Bring forward Option C, prepare the draft legis-
lation and keep an open mind to political feedback, particularly inter-
national, as well as the long-term requirements in the SAP and the
process of accession to the EU. 
1.3. New Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro and
the harmonization of economic policies 
Although a political consensus regarding the Constitutional Charter
was achieved at the beginning of December 2002, it is still uncertain
when the Charter will come into force (i.e. when the new common
state of Serbia & Montenegro will be operational), what the content of
the legal framework for the Charters enforcement will be, how fast and
to what extent the Charter will be implemented, when the single mar-
ket of Serbia & Montenegro will be established and at what pace and in
what way the harmonization of the currently very different econom-
ic legalization and policies in Serbia and in Montenegro will be under-
taken. 
Taking all this into account, a reasonable dilemma is should new
competition policy, legislation and institutions be allocated to the
(con)federal level (level of the common state of Serbia & Montenegro),
or on the level of the Republics. 
a. Option A: (Con)federal competition policy, legislation and insti-
tutions. Advantages and drawbacks of this option are mainly
inverse to Option B. An additional drawback is the uncertainty of
the political and institutional constellation of the new (con)feder-
ation. 
b. Option B: Republican, i.e. Serbian competition policy, legislation
and institutions. Advantages of this option are: (1) Existing
Parliament, which is operational (in session), so it will pass the
legislation; (2) There is feasible political support to the new com-
petition policy/legislation from the incumbent Serbian
Government, with already identified champions of the new legis-
lation/policy; (3) Building brand-new republican institution
(from scratch) could be more effective than reforming the existing
federal body. Drawbacks of this option are: (1) Possible overleap-
ing and duplication of institutional (administrative) capacities
between (con)federal and republican level; (2) Possible political
discontent, particularly from the EU/EC side (3) Single market
argument  a single market demands a single competition policy
and competition authority. The relevance of the single market
argument is not overwhelming because EU member states still
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have national competition policies, although there is a suprana-
tional single market. 
Taking into account the current political constellation and provi-
sions provided by the agreed Constitutional Charter, it is much more
likely that competition policy will be developed and implemented at
the republican (i.e. Serbian) level. Accordingly, Serbian market only
will be taken into account and firms from Montenegro will be treated
as foreign firms in the same way as firms from all other countries,
applying the effects doctrine of competition policy. 
Recommendation: The draft legislation should be prepared to fit
both (con)federal and Serbian level. The draft legislation should be
submitted to the Serbian Government (Ministry for Foreign Economic
Relations) with suggestions regarding its implementation. The new
Competition Law should be a Serbian piece of legislation  nonethe-
less, it will be, at the end of the day, a political decision by the Serbian
Government: either to pass it to the Serbian Parliament or the future
(con)federal one. 
If the political decision is to have two competition legislations/poli-
cies and competition authorities (one for Serbia and the other one for
Montenegro) there must be a body in charge of coordination of these
legislations/policies and coordination of policy development and insti-
tutions building process, particularly regarding the EU, i.e. regarding
the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), leading towards the
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). 
The Office for European integration at the (con)federal level of FR
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) that is in charge of the SAP will also
be in charge of further activities regarding European integration, i.e.
full EU membership. The office should be in charge as a communica-
tion channel between the EC and republican authorities regarding the
competition policy, particularly regarding daily communication with
the EC and its DGs. That role of the Office in coordinating the content
of the competition policy, legislation and its enforcement, would be
negligible, particularly because it should be expected that differences
between Serbian and Montenegrin competition policy will be negligi-
ble. Of course, the best option regarding the coordination issues is for
both republics to adopt the same piece of legislation. Nonetheless, the
role of the Office in terms of the communication with the EC in
process and receiving/distributing the ECs suggestions and guidelines
for legislation changes, their enforcement and various policy adjust-
ments in the course of SAP will be substantial. 
1.4. General path of economic and legal reform 
The general path of the reform has a significant impact on the devel-
opment of new competition policy and legislation. The impact is based
primarily on the general public (political) attention to the reform and
supply and demand of the available resources (primarily human
resources) for the new policies development and particularly their
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enforcement, i.e. the institution building process. Two general scenar-
ios can be envisaged at this moment. 
a. Scenario A: Fast, sustainable, thorough and broad economic and
legal reform in the country that will mean that public/political
attention will be focused on reform and there will be political
incentives for decision-makers to be allocated resources in that
field. As to the general demand for human resources in the reform
enforcement (enforcing competition and other reform policies),
it will, in principle, be higher as more reform policies are to be
implemented. On the other hand, since there are political invec-
tives for more resources to be poured into the reform institutions,
the supply (particularly in the long-run) of the human resources
to the institutions, i.e. to the policy enforcement will be greater.
Furthermore, successful reform (thorough price and foreign trade
liberalization, privatization, etc.) decreases the administrative
burden of the competition policy/legislation enforcement. 
b. Scenario B: Sluggish, unsustainable (stop-and-go), partial and
narrow economic and legal reform in the country that will mean
that political energy and public attention is directed away from
the reforms. Some other political priorities (partisan politics,
national security issues, etc.) will be at the focus of public atten-
tion and there will be no political incentives for decision-makers
to be heavily involved in the reforms. Furthermore, there could
even be some political incentives to frustrate reform if that reform
(particularly the consequences) are harmful to the current politi-
cal agenda. In short, the basic features of this scenario are inverse
to the Scenario A. 
One way or the other, at the beginning of the process of competi-
tion policy reform and the introduction of the new legislation there
will be an inevitable lack of human resources for its enforcement, par-
ticularly for the law enforcement. Accordingly, suggested solutions
should not be too demanding regarding the administrative burden,
i.e. they should keep the administrative burden to the minimum. It is
very important that advocacy, i.e. influencing other policies that cre-
ate non-competitive market structures and behavior, should be taken
into account as a very cost-effective method of advancing competition
policy. Coordination between the competition policy and other
reform policies is essential for obtaining efficient competition policy
outcomes. There is also a political value of competition policy in the
cases of price and foreign trade liberalization  from a political point
of view it is easier to fight political opponents of the liberalization
when competition policy/authority is in place, because it can be
argued that such a policy will be used if anything goes wrong for con-
sumers (the electorate). Furthermore, in the long run some of the
reform policies and institutions will inevitably vanish because their
job is done (the privatization agency, for example) and human
resources from these institutions will be (in the long run) available for
other institutions. 
24 New Competition Policy: A Policy Paper
Recommendation: Both scenarios imply that at least in the short-
run the supply of suitable human resources and administrative capaci-
ties for reform implementation will be limited. New competition poli-
cy design should take into account very limited human resources avail-
able (particularly in the short run), limited administrative capacities
and possible abuses of the competition policy. Accordingly, competi-
tion policy in both scenarios should be very focused to the most signif-
icant violations of competition law, i.e. violation of the competitive
market. 
2. THE NEED FOR A COMPETITION POLICY AND ITS CHARACTER
2.1. The need for any competition policy
The basic question is should FR Yugoslavia/Serbia have some/any
competition policy at all? Obviously, there two options regarding the
issue. 
a. Option A  The country should have some competition policy.
Basic reasons for the establishment of a competition policy and
legislation in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia are: desirable change of inher-
ited market structures, inhibiting the creation of new non-com-
petitive market structures, sanctioning of non-competitive mar-
ket behavior, producing incentives for allocative efficiency, dan-
ger of privatized monopolies and/or non-competitive structures,
political value of competition policy regarding price and foreign
trade liberalization (it is easier to implement these liberalizations),
enabling/fostering import competition by preventing foreclosure,
etc.
b. Option B  The country should not have any competition policy.
Basic reasons against any competition policy in FR
Yugoslavia/Serbia are: classical arguments of economic liberalism,
the possibility for abuse of the competition policy by the govern-
ment and/or competitors, increased uncertainty for firms,
decreased incentives for production efficiency, the possibility for
tackling the competition problem through import liberalization
and removing barriers to entry as the first-best policies, within the
framework of scarce human and other resources competition pol-
icy and competition authorities that will enforce will drain
resources from other policies/authorities like privatization policy
fiscal policy/tax administration. The final argument could be the
one for not triggering competition policy right now, but to wait
for its introduction for some time. For example, when privatiza-
tion is complete, there will be freely available resources for the
competition authority. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that
competition policy was not efficient dealing with inherited market
structures, particularly in some transition countries. Finally, there
is a danger of significant rent seeking prospects and corruption of
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the competition authority and the welfare loss due to these activi-
ties. 
It is highly unlikely that in the case of FR Yugoslavia/Serbia there is
no need for competition policy at all. The most important economic
argument is that competition policy can focus on the most significant
violations of competition both in terms of the type (non-competitive
behavior like cartels and abuse of market power) and their intensity
measured by the impact on the economic welfare (efficiency) that no
other alternative policy can challenge. Even the first-best policies of lib-
eralization cannot deal with some cases of non-competitive behavior.
Such a competition policy can increase economic efficiency and
improve social welfare. 
Recommendation: There should be a competition policy in FR
Yugoslavia/Serbia and new draft legislation should be submitted to the
Government. 
2.2. The character of the new competition policy 
As to the character of the competition policy, there are a few options
available:
a. Option A  Stringent and aggressive competition policy, with
both strict merger control (in principle both horizontal and verti-
cal) and strict prohibition of the abuse of dominant position
(market power) and restrictive agreements. Advantages of such a
policy are : (1) Existing (inherited) market structures are non-
competitive, so there are incentives for non-competitive behavior;
(2) There are limited prospects for fast foreign trade liberaliza-
tion; (3) Competition policy will deal with the sources of non-
competitive behavior, not the outcome, (4) There is a lack of mar-
ket tradition and the need to create competitive market criteria in
FR Yugoslavia/Serbia. Drawbacks of such a competition policy
are: (1) Strong institutional demand and limited administrative
capacity, i.e. huge administrative burden without prospects for
obtaining efficient institutions and needed human resources in
due course; (2) Increased uncertainty for the firms and private
entrepreneurs; (3) Increased possibility that perfectly competitive
behavior is labeled non-competitive (prohibited), so wrong
incentives for firms are created, particularly in the case of price
wars and production efficiency; (4) Greater room for the abuse of
competition policy, either by the government and/or by competi-
tors. 
b. Option B  Liberal and focused competition policy, with limited
merger control, avoiding price control of abusing dominant
firms, focused primarily on restrictive agreements, particularly
hard core horizontal agreements (cartels). Cartels should be vig-
orously attacked. Advantages of such a competition policy are: (1)
More economic freedom for firms and private entrepreneurs, fos-
tering economic efficiency; (2) Decreased regulatory (policy) risk
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for the firms and private entrepreneurs; (3) Better incentives for
economic efficiency, particularly for production (dynamic) effi-
ciency of the firms. Drawbacks of such a competition policy are:
(1) With limited merger (structure) control, the monitoring
demands on the competition institution/authority will be sub-
stantial  dominant position and market power would be more
frequent than with structure control; (2) Increased prospect for
administrative price control of firms that have dominant position.
(3) Due to the limited merger control, non-competitive market
structures foster restrictive horizontal agreements; (4) There is a
possible loss of some allocative efficiency due to the non-compet-
itive market structures and their abuse.  
c. Option C  pragmatic, flexible, non-dogmatic policy, but taking
into account the theoretical foundations on which it is based
(Chicago School), i.e. based on free market ideology. Option C
will combine the advantages of Option A and B, but will be much
closer to Option B. Such a competition policy should be focused
on the most significant problems of non-competitive market
structure and non-competitive behavior (hard core horizontal
agreement, for example). The paramount goal of such a policy is
to decrease business uncertainty to the market decision-makers
and to reduce the competition legislation implementation costs,
i.e. the administrative burden of the competition authority. 
Option C, in general, is definitely the most suitable option, particu-
larly if crucial elements of option B are included in the general charac-
ter of the competition policy. That will create the legal groundwork for
effective, focused and efficient competition policy.
Recommendation: Draft competition legislation should be up to a
point similar to modern legislation in other countries, enabling flexi-
bility, i.e. various types of competition policy to be enforced. On the
one hand, competition policy (particularly in terms of its enforcement)
should be narrower than competition legislation  the legislation
should provide a legal basis for quite a wide range of policies in terms
of their implementation. On the other hand, there should be some
legal constraints (provided by the Competition Law) of the competi-
tion policy enforcement to minimize the possibility of its abuse and
decrease uncertainty to the parties. 
Basically, there are two options regarding the legal constraints on the
character of the competition policy.
a. Option A: very broad legislation enabling the competition
authority to have substantial freedom in enforcement, i.e. the
character of the competition policy will be decided upon in the
stage of enforcement. Policy implementation should be fine tuned
by sub-statutory texts: decrees, by-laws, guidelines etc, as well as
in ad hoc decisions of the competition authority.
b. Option B: strong legislative constraints on the competition
authority regarding the character of competition policy, i.e.
although final decision over the character of competition policy
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will be made in the stage of its enforcement, the competition
authority will not have a wide range of possibilities, hence room
for abuse of the competition policy enforcement will be reduced.
This position is consistent with the position that there must be
some priorities of the competition policy (focused competition
policy) and the legislation should enable the competition authori-
ty to focus on these priorities and to minimize the abuse of the
competition policy and minimizing uncertainty for firms and pri-
vate entrepreneurs. 
Option B is definitely much more sensible for the existing and
expected conditions in FR Yugoslavia, particularly taking into account
that checks and balances other that the legislation have not been devel-
oped very far for the time being and should not be expected soon.
Accordingly, some basic economic freedoms should be protected by
the law. In the case of competition policy, the law should provide
strong legislative constraints on the competition authority. 
Recommendation: Taking into account the existing market struc-
tures and market practices in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia, as well as the limit-
ed resources available for competition policy enforcement, the priori-
ties (at least the short-term priorities) of the new competition
policy/legislation should be as follows: 
 to combat and prevent cartels;
 to enhance and foster privatization and economic restructuring;
 to increase economic freedom of firms and private entrepreneurs;
 to decrease uncertainty to all parties, particularly to firms and pri-
vate entrepreneurs
 to avoid price control as a mechanism of competition policy; 
 to influence other polices that have an impact on market compet-
itiveness, particularly those that create barriers to entry. 
3. THE AIMS OF COMPETITION POLICY
As to the aims of competition policy, there are basically two options,
with possible further diversification of option in the case of the second
option (Option B). 
a. Option A: Single competition policy aim. The obvious aim is
maximized economic efficiency; economic efficiency (the most
efficient market outcome) as the only aim of competition policy
 it is irrelevant whether the efficiency is allocative or productive,
the aggregate economic efficiency should be examined. It can
also be defined as maximized (economic) welfare. In that case it
is important to specify that there should be no different treat-
ment of consumer welfare and producers welfare and all the costs
(both private and social as the consequence of externalities)
should be taken into account. Effectively, that means sticking to
the compensation principle (Hicks). As a consequence, competi-
tion policy should protect competition, not competitors.
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Although the single aim of a competition policy is the superior
solution, it can be difficult to implement it due to the political
(public choice) pressures (still to be identified). Difficulties in the
implementation stage of a superior solution are rather modest for
the time being, because competition policy issues are still not on
the Serbian political agenda, hence no strong public choice pres-
sure can be expected as yet. 
b. Option B: Multiple competition policy aims. This means that
apart from the maximization of economic efficiency, some other
aims of competition policy should also be specified. Without con-
testing economic efficiency as the primary goal, additional goals
can be: free flow of products (goods) within a single market
(Serbia & Montenegro) and protection of SMEs, or small entre-
preneurs, as was the case in some countries (very few remain
today, only two). The first additional aim in the case of FR
Yugoslavia has a significant political background  the political
aim of the single market of Serbia & Montenegro can capture
competition policy and push it away from the aim of economic
efficiency. The same finding goes for protection of small entrepre-
neurs and fostering of SMEs. Political pressure to introduce these
components can be substantial, particularly the first one. 
Economic efficiency should be the only aim of competition policy.
All aspects should be taken into account (allocative vs. productive effi-
ciency and consumer vs. producers welfare). Artificial protection of
inefficient producers (big or small) should be avoided at any cost. Good
bankruptcy legislation and efficient bankruptcy process is important for
the protection of economic efficiency. An additional argument in favor
of a single goal competition policy is that politicians are very keen on
adding aims to some public policy, particularly in the stage of policy
enforcement. Accordingly, a legal provision as a barrier to such behav-
ior of multiplying the goals of public policies should be established. 
Recommendation: Article 1. of the new Competition Law should
explicitly point out that economic efficiency is (should be) the only aim
of competition policy. In the presentation terms this goal should be
described as increasing or maximizing consumer benefits (economic
welfare), because such a presentation has a substantial political value. 
4. COMPONENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF COMPETITION POLICY
4.1. Components of competition policy 
There are a few components (segments) of competition policy.
These components can be considered as general methods of imple-
mentation of competition policy. These components are: 
 competition legislation enforcement;
 competition policy advocacy;
 competition culture development  education. 
29Components and principles of competition policy
As to the first segment of competition policy (legislation enforce-
ment), it is traditional, inevitable and very resources consuming, i.e. it
inevitably creates a huge administrative burden on the competition
authority and other institutions. This is undoubtedly the first duty of
the competition authority. It should be taken into account that it should
not be the only duty of the authority and that substantial resources
should be allocated to the two other segments of competition policy. 
Competition policy advocacy is a very important segment of com-
petition policy. By effective the advocacy competition authority can
influence virtually all the policies that affect competition on the
domestic market. For example foreign trade policies (barriers to
import), privatization and restructuring policies (breaking-up of
existing non-competitive market structures and prevention of the
emergence of the new ones), various public policies that affect barriers
to entry for new firms, etc. These policies are the first-best policies in
many cases, compared with traditional competition policy. The more
resources allocated to competition policy advocacy, the more effective
the advocacy and the more competition on the domestic market,
hence the less need for stringent competition legislation enforcement. 
Development of a competition culture, i.e. education of all par-
ties concerned regarding competition policy is a method for making
the previous two segments of the competition policy more effective
(although sometimes education is classified as a segment of advoca-
cy). Increased knowledge of the parties involved, particularly cre-
ation of pro-competitive public opinion, increases the efficiency of
competition legislation enforcement. Furthermore, advocacy will
be more effective with widespread knowledge about the competi-
tion policy, particularly the effects of non-competitive market
structures and/or behavior. The existence of pro-competitive public
option creates the possibility for the competition authority to
recruit many allies for the effort to promote and enforce competi-
tion policy/legislation. 
4.2. Enforceability of competition legislation 
The basic principle is that a suitable policy framework should be
established, including competition legislation that can be enforced. A
law that is not enforced erodes the credibility of the competition
authorities and devalues everything contained in the law. Accordingly,
solutions that cannot be enforced (due to, for example, limited admin-
istrative capacity or lack of information and/or empirical experience)
should not be specified in the legislation. 
4.3. Flexibility principle
The legislation shall, on one hand, have certain flexibility so as to
allow discretionary decisions of the competition authority, i.e. enable
the authority to deal with all anti-competitive actions. On the other
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hand, the room for discretionary decisions shall be relatively limited, to
focus the activities of the competition authority, reduce the uncertain-
ty for economic decision-makers and to minimize the room for abuse
(both by the Government or by the private parties/competitors). In
principle, this dilemma can be resolved by the rule that the legislation
should provide a firm framework that will exclude the possibility of the
competition authority becoming involved in some activities, but also
allow flexibility in the fields that are feasible for the remaining authori-
ty action. In general, it is better to prevent abuses of competition poli-
cy than to control them. 
4.4. General character of the competition law 
As to the general character of the competition law, the crucial ques-
tion is: does the law have to specify (enumerate) examples of prohibit-
ed acts and actions, both in terms of an exhaustive list (numerus
clausus) and open ended, non-exhaustive list, i.e. examples only (exam-
pli causa)? 
a. Option A: No specification (enumeration) whatsoever, only the
general legal framework for decisions made by competition
authorities and courts. Accordingly, the discretionary rights at the
stage of enforcement will be substantial. Furthermore, it should
be taken into account that in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia there is no
widespread legal and economic knowledge (tradition) that would
enable enforcement authorities and the parties to grasp competi-
tion policy issues. Some benefit can be expected if some specifica-
tion is given in guidelines (sub-statutory text). 
b. Option B: Extensive specification (enumeration) of prohibited
acts and actions, leaving the possibility for more acts and actions
to be proclaimed illegal by the competition authorities. It is debat-
able whether that specification (enumeration) should be done in
the law itself or in the additional guidelines (sub-statutory text). 
The EU example is relevant for FR Yugoslavia/Serbia. Article 81 of
the Treaty of Rome (on restrictive agreements) prohibits agreements
that prevent, restrict or distort competition, and then gives several cat-
egories of general agreements which are therefore illegal. More specific
examples are then given in guidelines that are not part of Article 81
itself. Similarly, Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome (dominant position)
gives some examples of what constitute abuses of a dominant position,
but in a broad general sense.
Recommendation: Taking into account the poor tradition of imple-
mentation of competition policy/legislation in Serbia, i.e. expected
operations of competition authority and the lack of economic knowl-
edge of Serbian judges, Option B is the best option, and enumeration
should be a part of the statutory text (law), rather than sub-statutory
text (guidelines). Enumeration should, in general, be indicative (exam-
pli causa)  there must be a sufficient leeway for more acts and actions
to be proclaimed illegal by the competition authorities. Exceptions
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should be made only in the case of hard-core anti-competitive behav-
ior  here an exhaustive list of offenses (numerus clausus) should be
provided because these actions are per se prohibited. 
5. THE METHODS OF COMPETITION POLICY
There is a general division between traditional and non-traditional
methods of competition policy. Traditional methods are those that
form the arsenal of competition policy/legislation itself. Non-tradi-
tional methods are alternative methods and they will decrease the need
for enforcement of traditional methods of competition policy. In some
cases, they are complementary, because their effective implementation
will make competition policy traditional methods easier for implemen-
tation and/or more efficient. These methods are specified in other pub-
lic policies that have a substantial effect to competition, i.e. market
structures and the behavior of market decision makers. 
Advocacy as a segment of competition policy, i.e. the influence of the
competition authority on decision-markers in other fields of public
policy relevant to competition policy is the way for the competition
authority to be involved in the formulation and enforcement of these
public policies. Specifying the advocacy function in the competition
legislation will provide a legal basis for the competition authority to be
consulted and to mount pressure on the decision-makers regarding
new or existing relevant public policies, i.e. policies that have an impact
to competition policy.
Advocacy should be implemented in the case of new pieces of legisla-
tion, other new legal documents that have an impact on policy and poli-
cy enforcement strategies as well as the existing pieces of legislation. Day-
to-day enforcement of competition policy/legislation should be left out
of the advocacy scope. The dilemma is whether the advocacy role of the
competition authority shall include veto power (ruling decisions). 
a. Option A: Consultative role of the competition authority only
over new/existing relevant public policies (alternative competi-
tion policies) documents. Advantages of this option (consultative
role only) are: (1) Creating incentives to the competition authori-
ty for effective advocacy  the authority has to be convincing in
the advocacy; (2) Efficient process of government (both executive
and legislative branch) decision-making  no stalemates due to
the blackmailing veto power of the authority; (3) Efficient influ-
ence on policy making in terms of its improvement  the authori-
ty has every incentive to focus on those policies that have the max-
imum impact on competition; (4) The authority will have incen-
tives to focus only on the most important problems  only very
convincing cases will change public policy. 
b. Option B: Ruling (veto power) of the competition authority over
new public policies documents. Drawbacks of this option (veto
power of competition authority) are: (1) Competition between
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public/state authorities  it is likely that such competition would
be disadvantageous for the decision-making process; (2)
Inefficient procedures for making decisions and enacting new leg-
islation and/or enforcing new public policies. 
Option A is definitely the better one. The main reason is that it pro-
vides incentives for competition authority officials to do their advoca-
cy job efficiently, i.e. for their advocacy to be effective. That will include
persuasion of the decision-makers (both in executive and legislative
braches of government) and the public. Veto power will give the com-
petition authority to much power and their position will be too com-
fortable, i.e. there will not be sufficient incentive for efficient advocacy,
because they know that at the end of the day they can block a new piece
of legislation. That creates incentives for strategic behavior of the com-
petition authority and policy horse-trading with other
agencies/authorities. In short, effective influence does not mean that it
is efficient, i.e. that efficient public policies are adopted and enforced at
the end of the day. 
More effective advocacy of suitable alternative public policies means
that this policy will do the job of traditional competition policy and that
the workload of the competition authority in (traditional) competition
policy enforcement, i.e. in the competition legislation enforcement will
be reduced. That is a strong incentive for the competition authority to
be efficient in its advocacy role, particularly taking into account that it
can publicly claim credit for all the policy improvements. 
Veto power will increase the administrative burden of the competi-
tion authority, particularly taking into account that in some cases the
advocacy should also encompass municipalities, i.e. local authorities
and their public policies that affect competition on the local market. In
addition, the enforcement leverage of the competition authority in the
case of municipalities is rather ineffective, so veto power that is effec-
tively not enforced will ruin the credibility of the authority altogether.
Furthermore, there should be no competition between agencies and
authorities for policy formulation and enforcement (possible veto ret-
ribution strategy, or veto deterrent strategy). 
Recommendation: Competition law should provide a legal ground
for the competition authority to have a consultative role in the case of
new policies and legislation that is relevant for competition policy.
Furthermore, there should be a legal provision for the competition
authority to initiate review and examination of existing policies and
legislation relevant for competition policy. 
5.1. Liberalization of foreign trade 
Liberalization of foreign trade, particularly import liberalization is
one of the main mechanisms for bringing competition to the domestic
market. In the case of many products if there is relatively free import, it
is not important whether there is only one producer of that product in
the country. 
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a. Benefits of the foreign trade liberalization are: (1) It is very effec-
tive in the most of the cases, i.e. in the case of most of the prod-
ucts; (2) There are both short-term and long-term beneficial
results to the competition; (3) There is no need for the time-con-
suming and painstaking institutional building process of competi-
tion authority; (4) There is no administrative burden to the
authority. 
b. Drawbacks of the foreign trade liberalization are: (1) It is not
effective in some cases, i.e. for some products (non-tradables and
tradables with substantial transportation costs); (2) There are
substantial political pressures against foreign trade liberalization,
so such a policy may not be feasible, particularly in Serbia with the
recent return of protectionism as the preferred public policy; (3)
Possible exclusionary practices by incumbent firms (barriers to
entry), particularly regarding distribution networks for new
imports or/and foreign producers, can slow down the effects of
liberalization on competition.  
Although foreign trade liberalization can be a very effective substi-
tute for domestic competition policy, it is not a panacea for all the
problems (non-competitive behavior) and the obstacles for further
foreign trade liberalization in Serbia in the future will be substantial. 
5.2. Removing barriers to entry 
Regarding the policy of removing barriers to entry, all barriers to
entry should be taken into account as a crucial factor of non-competi-
tive market structures/behavior: import related, administrative, regula-
tory and other barriers. Barriers to exit are considered as a special case
of barriers to entry. 
a. Advantages of the policies of removing barriers to entry are: (1)
These are policies that can bring about competition (new entries)
that will provide pressure on non-competitive behavior; (2) Some
of the barriers to entry can easily be eliminated; (3) There can be
swift beneficial effects to economic efficiency without time-con-
suming institution building and administrative burden on the
competition authority. 
b. Drawbacks of the policies of removing barriers to entry are: (1)
Some administrative barriers to entry are substantial and it cannot
be expected (due to the political process) that they will be elimi-
nated swiftly; (2) Some barriers to entry are decentralized (they
are on the local authority level), hence very resistant; (3) Some
barriers to entry are completely exogenous to political process and
public policies (i.e. technological and economic barriers to entry)
and they cannot be changed rapidly by any public policy; (4)
Barriers to entry due to the high country risk can be removed only
very slowly in piecemeal political process. 
Removing/decreasing barriers to entry should be paramount for
government economic and reform policies, but should not be a burden
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for competition policy in terms of competition legislation enforce-
ment. There should be a separate examination of those (administrative
and/or legal) barriers that can be removed quickly and those that are of
a more permanent nature, be they of political, economic or institution-
al nature. There should be a separate examination of the prospects for
elimination of entry barriers in the next three or five years, drawing on
the recent CEE experience.
5.3. Free trade agreements 
Widening of the free trade zone (regionally and in the distant future
with the EU) can be considered as a way in which the problem of min-
imum efficient scale for certain undertakings/plants may be overcome.
As this will increase the size of the market to accommodate the mini-
mum efficient scale, benefiting Yugoslav/Serbian firms due to the
economy of scale production efficiency to be expected. Another com-
ponent of FTA impact is the impact of import liberalization. 
5.4. Privatization and restructuring policies
The privatization model should not be selected according to its
effects on the competition policy, but these effects should be taken into
account in the implementation of the privatization model, i.e. selecting
privatization implementation policies. The competition authority
should be in a position to advocate those polices that will create com-
petitive market structure or at least prevent it from creating non-com-
petitive market structures. For example, advocacy in favor of batch
tendering for industries with the provision that each bidder can buy-
out only a specified number of firms. Furthermore, restructuring of big
firms before privatization provides room for the impact to non-com-
petitive market structures. Fragmentation of these firms as a part of
pre-privatization restructuring should clear the way for establishing
competitive market structures. On the other hand, wrong and inappro-
priate models of privatization, particularly when implemented consis-
tently can create huge non-competitive market structures that must be
treated with stringent competition policy and rigorous enforcement of
competition legislation.  
There should be no competition and overlapping between the com-
petition authority and privatization agency: increased competition,
both in terms of competitiveness of market structures and behavior
could be side effects of the privatization, depending on the privatiza-
tion model and its implementation. 
5.5. Traditional methods of competition policy 
There is a question regarding traditional methods of competition
policy (merger control, control of abuse of dominant position, restric-
tive agreements prohibition and control) and their enforcement: In the
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case of FR Yugoslavia/Serbia, what should be relation/ratio/share of the
mentioned four alternative methods of competition policy compared
with the traditional methods of competition policy? 
There is no way to provide a specific answer to this question.
Nonetheless, any breakthrough in the listed substitutes to traditional
competition policy should be exploited in the fine-tuning of the com-
petition policy and its enforcement. Although the new legislation
should provide a legal groundwork for stringent competition policy for
the scenario in which no breakthrough in alternative methods of com-
petition policy materializes, there must be legal safeguards against
abuse of the competition policy/legislation. 
Alternative competition policies are the first-best policies because
there are no discretionary powers, no rulings on cases, as there is with
the traditional competition policy methods, no administrative burden
and no room for the abuse of the competition policy by the state
and/or other competitors. The crucial incentive for the competition
agency for their advocacy role, pushing forward alternative methods of
competition policy is that it offers the possibility of reducing its admin-
istrative burden. 
The more effective the advocacy role played by the competition
authority, the less the administrative burden on the authority regard-
ing traditional competition policy implementation. This incentive
should be clear to everyone in the competition authority and should
influence the general strategy of the authoritys operations. Smaller
administrative burden will also reduce possibility for the abuse of the
competition policy. 
6. ELEMENTS OF COMPETITION POLICY (1)  MERGER CONTROL
6.1. Merger control  the need and effects of such control 
The basic question regarding merger control is whether FR
Yugoslavia/Serbia needs merger control as a segment of competition
policy at all, particularly having in mind the existing (social ownership)
and future ownership structure of Serbian firms (after privatization).
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that there has been no
merger control in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia for the time being, i.e. there is
no experience whatsoever regarding merger control enforcement. In
general, of course, the feasible option is to exclude merger control form
the competition policy and legislation. 
a. Option A: Merger control as an indispensable segment of compe-
tition policy for FR Yugoslavia/Serbia. The framework for merger
control should be a general and consistent one, but which can
nevertheless be easily applied to what will undoubtedly be rapidly
changing markets in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia, i.e. substantial flexibil-
ity must be build into the framework. As FR Yugoslavia/Serbia
integrates more and more with the EU economy, the markets in
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which firms compete will evolve, and the merger control frame-
work should be able to take this into account. Advantages of hav-
ing merger control as a segment of competition policy are: (1) By
introducing merger control competition policy will prevent the
creation of non-competitive market structures as the basis for
non-competitive behavior; (2) Competition policy will create
conditions within which the free market will operate, rather than
focusing on monitoring and control of non-competitive market
structures and the behavior of the firms with market power, such
as price control of firms with dominant position; (3) Decreasing
the possibility for the abuse of competition policy by exerting
price control on firms with dominant position; (4) The possibili-
ty for cartel control evasion by mergers will be eliminated, (5)
Compatibility with modern legislation in the World will be
achieved. Drawbacks of the introduction of merger control: (1)
Merger control inevitably increases the administrative burden on
the competition authority; (2) Merger control will increase busi-
ness uncertainty among firms and private entrepreneurs; (3)
Possibly partly wrong incentives to firms will be created; (4)
Merger control is inherently future oriented  it is less exact,
more speculative, so it is difficult to establish good and precise
policy in that field. 
b. Option B: No merger control at all. The Advantages and
Drawbacks of this option are inverse to Option A an additional
reason against merger control would be that it cannot be effec-
tively enforced in the case of elusive social ownership.
Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that ownership is not so
elusive as it was ten years ago and, more important, it will dis-
appear through the (compulsory) privatization process in the
next few years. The additional drawback of Option B is that it is
highly probable that the EC will, within the framework of the
SAA, insists on inclusion of merger control in competition leg-
islation. Taking that into account, it is better to start right now
the development of the whole mechanism of merger control
starting with: merger control policy and merger control legal
provision.
The advantages of having merger control provision in the legislation
(Option A), i.e. to have merger control as an instrument of the compe-
tition policy are definitely greater than the disadvantages. However, the
development of the merger control section of the competition legisla-
tion and its subsequent enforcement should be undertaken very care-
fully, taking into account its drawbacks and possible adverse side
effects. 
Recommendation: There should be provision for merger control in
the new competition legislation. There must be a clear merger control
policy and the legal provisions should enable the competition authori-
ty to focus on the aims of that policy, i.e. to block the competition
authority from any possible abuse of merger control. 
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6.2. Suspension of merger control enforcement
As to the enforcement of merger control, the crucial question is:
should there be a suspension (holiday) of merger control enforcement
for some period after enactment of the new legislation (12 months, for
example)? Accordingly, there are two options:
a. Option A: Some suspension of enforcement of merger control
enforcement with precise date from which merger control will be
enforced. Advantages of having suspension of enforcement are:
(1) Signal that merger control will be enforced in due course, so
firms can prepare for it; (2) Slot of time for designing sub-statuto-
ry texts (guidelines for decision-making) that will enable efficient
enforcement of competition legislation in the field of merger con-
trol; (3) Suspension will provide a time for institution building
and enabling the competition authority to prepare itself for the
enforcement (training) and designing the procedures for merger
control investigation and decision-making. (4) The suspension
will enable the majority of the privatization process not to be
slowed down. Drawbacks of having suspension of enforcement
are: (1) The signal will be sent on leniency in competition policy
enforcement; (2) Big mergers within the privatization process will
happen during the holiday time, so an incentive will be created
for mergers to happen swiftly.
b. Option B: No suspension of merger control enforcement.
Advantages and drawback are inverse to Option A. The additional
drawback of Option B would demand a substantial time needed
for the competition authority to be enabled for dealing with
merger control, so effective merger control will not be enforceable
for some time. This lack of enforcement of the merger control will
inevitable undermine the credibility of the whole competition
policy. 
Option A (temporary suspension of the merger control enforce-
ment) is much more reasonable and its implementation demands
answers to two questions: (1) What should be the suspension time (ini-
tial suggestion is 12 months)? (2) Should there be a suspension of
enforcement of the sections of the new legislation on merger control
only or the enforcement of the whole legislation (vacatio legis)? The
answer to the questions depends on the political dynamics of the leg-
islative bodies activities and the time frame for adoption of the new leg-
islation. 
Recommendation: There should be a suspension in merger control
enforcement or the whole new legislation enforcement for a specific
time after adoption of the new legislation  12 months from the legisla-
tion enactment. 
The most suitable way for that suspension of the merger control
enforcement is suspension of the new Competition Law enforcement
for 12 months. There should be a legal provision/text in the Law like:
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This act will be enforced as from, say, 1st January 2004, i.e. a date from
which the legislation will be enforced should be stipulated.  
6.3. Merger control and privatization in Serbia 
The crucial question is what the influence of merger control will be
on the pace and outcome (success) of privatization. There are a few
options regarding the link between competition policy and the privati-
zation process in Serbia. 
a. Option A: There must be a visible and strong link between pri-
vatization policy and competition policy, i.e. a procedural link
between privatization law and competition policy law. The
basic idea is to control mergers that will be enforced through
tenders/auctions. Merger control clearance should be given
before the final stage of tenders/auctions, so all competitors
should be proclaimed eligible for the final stage of the bidding
and for the capital transaction. The merger control over priva-
tization should be enforced in the same way that it is enforced
in all other cases. 
b. Option B: General exemption on privatization, i.e. privatization
process should not be the subject of merger control. Accordingly,
all mergers enforced through privatization will be exempted from
merger control. 
c. Option C: Version of Option A, suspension (holiday) on
enforcement of merger control in the privatization process, com-
pletely linked to the general suspension on merger control
enforcement. 
Recommendation: The Option C is a reasonable option, the best
one out of the three. It will enable the relatively smooth introduction of
merger control in the privatization process. Stringent and immediate
merger control enforcement will inevitably slow down and complicate
the privatization process. Block exemption of privatization mergers is a
politically bad solution due to the different treatment of the mergers
and it will reduce the credibility of the competition policy and compe-
tition legislation enforcement. 
Furthermore, the political tension that can be built up along the
Option B, which effectively exempts privatization mergers from the
merger control segment of the competition policy, can be solved, at
least in the terms of presentation, but that will demand a lot of
wasted political energy. The point is that other provisions of the
competition legislation will/should be enforced on the privatized
firms exempted from merger control, like the provisions of the
abuse of dominant position (if dominant position is created by the
merger) or prohibition of horizontal agreement (cartels) that are
more probable if the industry is more concentrated. Nonetheless,
the general exemption of privatization from merger control could
be perceived as the first step towards thorough exemption of priva-
tization, i.e. that no provision of the competition legislation at all
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should be enforced in the case of privatization and recently priva-
tized firms. 
In general, the privatization of non-competitive market structures
would create incentives for non-competitive behavior, i.e. new private
owners would exercise market power. Nonetheless, the danger that pri-
vatization itself will create non-competitive market structures/behav-
ior in Serbia is not great for four basic reasons: (1) Very few good big
firms will be available to be privatized by tender in the near term, par-
ticularly after the period of suspension of the new competition legisla-
tion enforcement expires; (2) The Privatization Ministry/Agency has
already taken into account industrial organization issues in the privati-
zation process, blocking the formation of non-competitive market
structures during the privatization process; (3) Strong advocacy activi-
ty on the part of the competition authority will be very beneficial giving
privatization Ministry/Agency informal guidelines for the remaining
batch of privatization tenders and auctions before the merger control
legislation is enforced; (4) All big Serbian firms (conglomerates) that
are loss making for the time being (and the majority of them are), will
be thoroughly restructured (fragmented by spin-offs and creating of
new smaller enterprises) before privatization, according to the actual
privatization program. 
It is of the utmost importance that special care should be taken
regarding the design of an efficient enforcement mechanism of merger
control in privatization, both in the terms of possible loopholes, on the
one hand, and swift implementation of privatization, on the other, i.e.
privatization should not be slowed down by a merger control mecha-
nism built into the process. There are a few options regarding the
design of the enforcement mechanism for merger control involvement
in the privatization process:
a. Option A: Not to have any special articles in the Competition Law
regarding privatization, merger control will be enforced by
straightforward enforcement of the new competition legislation.
Some detailed guidance for the enforcement could be provided in
sub-statutory texts in the field of competition policy.
b. Option B: To have explicit articles in the Privatization law that
will deal with merger control within the privatization process.
These articles would specify all the details of the enforcement of
merger control in the privatization process. 
c. Option C: Not to change the privatization law, but to include
merger control mechanisms into sub-statutory texts (Decrees) in
the field of privatization policy. The amended privatization
Decree should specify the obligation of the Privatization Agency
to verify that there is a merger control clearance before signing the
privatization contact in cases where the parties are liable to merg-
er control. 
Option C is the best option for the implementation of merger con-
trol in the privatization process after the suspension of competition
legislation enforcement expires. The suspension of the enforcement
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will provide enough time for all the necessary preparations for the
enforcement of the merger control in the privatization. All the partici-
pants of the privatization process (buyers) should have obtained clear-
ance (if necessary, i.e. if they are above notification threshold) before
signing the privatization contract in the case of both tenders and auc-
tions. The burden of getting the clearance should be on the buyers
hence all information relevant for merger should be presented to the
potential buyers/investors (i.e. to the public) in the early stage of each
privatization transaction. In case of tenders that should be a part of
advertisement for financial advisers and in the case of auctions that
should be a part of the privatization prospectus. The Competition
authority should keep pre-merger notification strictly confidential, i.e.
this notification should not be used for the benefit of potential tender
or/and auction competitors. 
6.4. The range of merger control
As to the range of merger control, the crucial question is should
merger control be established only regarding merger strictu senso (sta-
tus change, fusion or takeover of legal entities) or mergers in a wider
sense (transfer of ownership without changing the legal status of the
legal entity, purchase of shares). Furthermore, the effects of strict
takeover control (not merger related) should be taken into account.
Finally, the issue of the range of merger control is relevant for the case
of the companies in bankruptcy, i.e. should the takeover of a bankrupt
company be subject to merger control. 
In general, all forms of mergers should be subject to control/chal-
lenge. There is no need for special treatment of various forms of merg-
ers (legal entitys status change, fusions, takeovers, concentrative or
coordinative joint-ventures, purchase of shares etc.). The crucial ele-
ment of merger regarding competition policy is obtaining control, i.e.
the question is who has effective control over the company (undertak-
ing) after the merger. Case-by-case analysis of the mergers should be
able to deal with all the eventualities. The legislation should provide a
framework (legal basis) for all the mergers to be challenged, in terms of
effective control of the company (undertaking). 
One of the crucial questions is about the method of merger control
in the case of consecutive purchase of shares, particularly regarding the
information on these capital transactions. According to the actual
Yugoslav/Serbian legislation, all purchases of shares bigger that 5% of
the total value of shares (total value of the capital) of the company
must be registered at the Securities Exchange Commission and should
be immediately registered by the Central Security Register.
Furthermore, if a single investor acquires more than 37.5% of shares of
one company cumulatively, that change will also have to be notified to
the Securities Exchange Commission and be registered by the Central
Security Register. Furthermore, the Central Security Register provides
information on all the owners of joint stock companies, i.e. companies
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whose shares are floated on the stock market. Accordingly, informa-
tion gathered by the Securities Exchange Commission and Central
Security Register is sufficient for effective control of mergers effected
by the consecutive purchase of shares. 
Finally, companies in bankruptcy should not be excluded form com-
petition policy legislation, i.e. takeovers of these companies should be
challenged as other mergers. Nonetheless, assets sales in the case of
companies in liquidation has no economic effect of merger whatsoev-
er, hence it should not be liable for merger control, i.e. these operations
should not be under the jurisdiction of the competition law. 
6.5. The method of merger control 
The crucial dilemma regarding the method of merger control is:
whether there should be an obligation to acquire prior
authorization/clearance (pre-merger control) for the mergers or obli-
gation to notify only (post-merger control). Accordingly, there are two
options: 
a. Option A: Prior authorization of mergers for all the (above the
threshold, i.e. relevant) firms/mergers. Benefits of this option are:
(1) Effective merger control is established; (2) There is no need for
post-merger activities of competition authorities (3) Uncertainty
for the firms and private entrepreneurs is decreased. Drawbacks of
this option are: (1) Creating the room for possible delays in merg-
er activities and/or privatization, that could be harmful to eco-
nomic efficiency; (2) Substantial administrative burden is
imposed on the competition authority; (3) There are only specu-
lative grounds for ex ante decision-making in the process of merg-
er control  effects of the merger are not known at the time when
decision on them is made. 
b. Option B: Prior notification only as the method of merger control.
This option would enable the competition authority to deal with
the merged firms after the merger took place. Advantages of this
option are: (1) Ex post decision of the authority will be based on
facts (accurate information) regarding the effects of the merger,
rather than pre-merger speculations; (2) There will be a rather lim-
ited administrative burden, only more demanding monitoring of
the merged firms will be necessary; (3) There will be no delays in
merger activities and/or privatization. Drawbacks of this option
are: (1) Increased uncertainty for merged firms, so reduced incen-
tives for efficiency-gaining mergers and privatization; (2)
Introduction of inefficient and possibly ineffective merger control;
(3) There will be increased administrative burden for the competi-
tion authority due to the need to monitor the merged firms. 
Option A (prior authorization of mergers) is definitely a better
model for FR Yugoslavia/Serbia because the drawbacks are much
smaller than the advantages. Ex post activities of the competition
authority (divestitures of already accomplished mergers) should be
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avoided at all costs. Hence, all mergers should be cleared (authorized)
before becoming legally effective. A clearance/authorization of a merg-
er by the competition authority means that no merger investigation
can be launched later, so uncertainty for firms and private entrepre-
neurs is minimized. Some other cases against the merged firms can be
filed (misconduct, abuse of dominant position, etc.), but the merger
that has been cleared/ authorized cannot be challenged again. 
6.6. The type of merger notification 
Since prior authorization of mergers has been selected as the method
of merger control, the type of notification that properly fits the selected
method of merger control should be introduced. In principle, there are
three types of notification that can be used for merger control: (a)
compulsory pre-merger notification; (b) compulsory post-merger
notification; (c) voluntary (pre-merger) notification. 
a. Option A: Compulsory pre-merger notification with two stages of
decision- making is a reasonable option. All firms liable to notifi-
cation requirement (above the notification threshold) must sub-
mit the notification to the competition authority asking for clear-
ance of the planned merger. There should be standardized infor-
mation that will be required from the parties  the best way of
enforcement will be a standardized form of the pre-merger notifi-
cation request that should be filled out by all the parties notifying
their merger. The competition authority in a short time should
decide about future actions: a) there is no action so the merger is
cleared; or b) there will be further investigation after which the
merger can be cleared or prohibited. Advantages of this option
are: (1) Effective notification mechanism for efficient merger con-
trol; (2) Reduced uncertainty for the firms and private entrepre-
neurs. Drawbacks of this option are: (1) Substantial administra-
tive burden on the competition authority; (2) Possible delays in
privatization process. 
b. Option B: Compulsory post-merger notification. This type of
notification makes no sense in combination with prior authoriza-
tion of all mergers as a merger control method already suggested
for Serbia, because it is practically mechanism for post-merger
monitoring and action. 
c. Option C: Voluntary pre-merger notification is an approach in
which there is no threshold for notification, but the firms volun-
tarily notify their merger asking the competition authority for
these mergers to be cleared/authorized before they take place.
Firms will have incentive to notify the merger and to get clearance
for the merger, eliminating any possible delayed legal action
against the merger. Advantages of this option are: (1) Small
administrative burden to the competition authority; (2) Smaller
possible delay in privatization and merger activities. Drawbacks of
this option are: (1) Virtually ineffective merger control; (2) Weak
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incentives for firms to notify their mergers, particularly taking
into account legal tradition in Serbia. 
Option A is the best option, i.e. effectively the only feasible option
for merger control in Serbia, taking into account the method of merg-
er control that has been selected. 
Mergers below the specified threshold are not subject to the com-
petition law, i.e. they are not under the jurisdiction of the law, and
hence these mergers cannot be challenged by competition authority
or private party as a part of private enforcement of the competition
law. Such a solution decreases uncertainty for firms and private
entrepreneurs. 
6.7. Notification threshold
The issue of notification thresholds includes a few issues/questions:
(a) threshold levels, particularly the dilemma objective and/or subjec-
tive thresholds; (b) possible differentiation of thresholds types and lev-
els across the industries; (c) possible differentiation of thresholds types
and levels among the type of merger (horizontal and vertical)? As to
the threshold differentiation, there are a few options:
a. Option A: Standard threshold for all industries and types of merg-
ers (horizontal, vertical and conglomerates). 
b. Option B: Different thresholds for different industries and types
of mergers. 
Option A is a simple, straightforward and efficient solution. Option
A is virtually the only feasible option because option B (different
thresholds for different industries and types of mergers) will provide
too much uncertainty, confusion and room for too much discretion
for the firms. For practical purposes, specific thresholds should be
established only in banking and insurance industry, possibly also in
wholesale and retail trade.
Recommendation: Option A (standard threshold for all the merger
cases) should be introduced into the legislation. 
As to the types of thresholds, there are two possible options:
c. Option C: Objective threshold (turnover or/and assets).
d. Option D: Subjective threshold (market share, etc.).
Option C is virtually the only feasible option. Turnover data should
be used as threshold, both (cumulative) minimum combined turnover
of the firms that will merge and minimum turnover of one of the firms.
It is possible, but not recommended to involve turnover on
domestic/international market, the latter particularly important for a
foreign investor. Assets values, in principle, should not be used due to
unreliable data (to be used only in banking and, possibly, insurance
industry). Some of the proposed thresholds should be tested on exist-
ing firms in Serbia and their turnover in the last year to get the idea
about the number of firms liable to merger control.  
The recommendation is that no international turnover data should
be required, only national. Nonetheless, if the foreign company acquires
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a domestic firm, its export to the domestic market should be considered
as a part of combined revenue of the merged firms. Combined turnover
of the merging firms and minimum turnover of one of them are both
necessary conditions. The merger/firms are liable to compulsory notifi-
cation only if both conditions are met simultaneously. 
Indirect ownership control of the firms should always be taken into
account in the case of mergers. It is still unclear how to select a relevant
cut-off point for indirect ownership. Nonetheless, it is clear that this
cut-off point should not be specified by the statutory text
(Competition Law), but rather by guidelines (sub-statutory text). 
Since there is a legal obligation for the firms to notify their mergers,
failure to notify is illegal, so there must a sanction for the failure. The
sanction, apart from the fine, is that the merger is to be proclaimed null
and void. Accordingly, the merger registration in the court will be pro-
claimed null and void. 
If the merger is already registered and the firm is established, the
sanction then will effectively be divestiture of the new firm, or compul-
sory selling of the shares, i.e. (re)establishing the situation that existed
before the merger took place. As to the process, the proof of the failure
to notify becomes the effective notification of the merger. 
As to inaccurate data submitted in the notification (leading the com-
petition authority to make a decision on the merger on the basis of
wrong information), if the disclosure is proven to be inaccurate, the
parties should be penalized (fines) for disclosing inaccurate informa-
tion and a new notification should be submitted. 
As a sanction for failure to notify accurately, effective divestiture can
be ordered. Such a limited divestiture is due to the fault of the parties
(not to notify or to notify inaccurately). In other words, the risk for
their own actions (deeds) lies with the parties. By following simple
basic notification rules that risk is eliminated. The divestiture is limit-
ed, so no big economic/legal problems can be expected. The sooner
failure is disclosed, the simpler divestiture will be. 
6.8. Horizontal and vertical mergers  differential treatment 
As to the treatment of the mergers, the crucial question is: should the
legislation treat horizontal and vertical mergers differently at all, and, if
yes, how that should be achieved? Basically, there are two options
regarding differential treatment: 
a. Option A: No differential treatment at all, because there is no
benefit from different legal treatments of horizontal and verti-
cal mergers. Case-by-case analysis (the rule of reason) should
be able to deal with all the eventualities. Naturally, all the
future effects of the proposed merger should be taken into
account. It should not be a case of whether there should be a
different treatment, but rather that in addition to the competi-
tive and economic efficiency impact on the horizontal level,
vertical elements, and any competitive and economic efficiency
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effects that these may have, should also be properly taken into
account. 
b. Option B: Yes, horizontal and vertical mergers should be legally
treated separately in terms of the burden of proof. Horizontal
mergers are to be presumed to be anti-competitive and the bur-
den of proof should be on the parties (firms). Vertical mergers are
to be presumed to be pro-competitive and the burden of proof
should be on the competition authority. 
Option A looks much better. It should be applied as the rule of reason
for all mergers and there should be no differentiation between horizontal
and vertical mergers. The burden of proof should be on the competition
authority, i.e. the authority will have to demonstrate that the merger
effects are adverse to competition and consumers economic welfare in
each case. In other words, all mergers should be presumed to be pro-
competitive, and the job of the competition authority is to demonstrated
they are not if the authority decides to challenge a merger. 
6.9. The procedure of merger control 
The procedure of merger control has two tiers. The first one is essen-
tially that after the notification, the competition authority (the Office of
the competition authority) decides whether the merger can be uncondi-
tionally cleared or if some additional research/investigation (considera-
tions) is needed for the final decision. The decision must be reached
within 30 days from the date of notification. The decisions can be:
 a formal clearance of the merger; 
 information that a second tier investigation has to take place. 
Both decisions should be published in the Official Gazette of the
country. 
If there is no answer within 30 days, that will, form a legal point of
view be the same as a formal clearance of the merger  silence means
consent. The merger can be registered in the court.
The courts (judges) involved in the registration will have the infor-
mation on merger thresholds. Accordingly, there is no need for clear-
ance for the mergers/firms below the merger thresholds, i.e. these
firms can effectively merge without involvement of the competition
authority.
Information of the beginning of the second tier investigation
should be followed by a list of the additional information that the par-
ties should submit to the competition authority. The 90 days period
for the final decision of the competition authority should start at the
moment when this information has been provided by the parties, i.e.
there should be a confirmation in writing on that by the competition
authority. 
The competition authority can extend the period for a final decision
for an additional 30 days. If after 90 days, there is no decision from the
competition authority, nor extension for an additional 30 days, the
merger will be considered cleared  silence means consent. Again if no
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decision is forthcoming from the competition authority after an addi-
tional 30 days, the merger will be considered cleared  again silence
means consent.
The final decisions of the competition authority (i.e. its decision-
making body  the commission) can be:
 unconditional clearance of the merger;
 conditional clearance of the merger; 
 unconditional blocking (prohibition) of the merger. 
The final decision should be published in the Official Gazette. As to
the conditional clearance of the merger, there should be no time frame
(limit) for meeting the conditions for the merger by the parties. The
competition authority will, according to information from the parties
and verification of that information, decide if the stipulated conditions
have been met and that accordingly the merger is cleared.
6.10. Legal standard of merger control
As to the legal standard of merger control, the crucial question is:
should mergers be per se banned? Of course, the reasonable answer is
no  there should not be a per se ban on mergers. A case-by-case analy-
sis carried out on pro-competitive merits of each merger should con-
stitute the basis for the decision. This is the way in which the rule of
reason is effectively introduced into the ruling. 
Since the mergers should not be per se banned, i.e. the rule of reason
is introduced as a legal standard, the question is how to set the discre-
tionary criteria for the mergers/blocking approval (the rule of reason
guidance)? In other words, what should be the standard for the rule of
reason in case of merger examination? 
There are two well-known and widely accepted standards for merger
clearance/blocking. One is the US standard (substantially lessening the
competition), and the other is the EU standard (dominant test  creat-
ing or strengthening dominant position). There has been substantial
convergence between the two standards in recent times, particularly in
the stage of implementation in institutionally developed economies.
Nonetheless, there must be a solid and clear doctrine for the structured
rule of reason in the case of an institutionally rather undeveloped econ-
omy like FR Yugoslavia/Serbia. 
Taking into account the proposed concept of competition policy for
FR Yugoslavia/Serbia, i.e. that the competition policy should be
focused and transparent, the criteria for the rule of reason in the merg-
er case should be rather clear and restrictive. Considering dominance
test an option should be based, among other things, on the rather
restrictive criteria/thresholds for dominance already suggested in FR
Yugoslavia/Serbia. 
Taking all this into account, there are two options regarding the
test/standard for the merger control:
a. Option A: SLC (substantially lessening the competition) standard
to be used for merger consideration criteria. Advantages of
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Option A are: (1) Possible flexibility of merger control, i.e. more
mergers can be challenged under the rule of reason. Drawbacks of
this enforcement of SLC standard: (1) Increased uncertainty for
firms and private entrepreneurs, because the merger standard is
not precise and many mergers can be challenged; (2) room for
possible abuses of the competition policy (merger control) will be
created. (3) The framework for unfocused/excessive competition
policy will be created
b. Option B: Dominance test to be used for merger consideration
criteria. Advantages of using dominance test are: (1) It is
European/EU consistent (2) It enables more restrictive competi-
tion policy towards the mergers control, i.e. more liberal towards
mergers. (3) It decreases uncertainty in for firms and private
entrepreneurs in their business planning.
Option B looks far better; hence the dominance test should be used
as the criteria for merger evaluation, i.e. examination of the impact of
the merger on economic efficiency and economic welfare. The crite-
ria is to be applied in a way that enables the evaluation of the impact
that a particular merger has on overall economic efficiency. There
should be strict guidance for the ruling (structured rule of reason),
i.e. the decision-making process should be strictly defined rather than
the outcome.
It is very important to incorporate production efficiency claims
into the consideration and to examine them in the merger approval
process, particularly if the dominance test has not been passed, i.e.
if the merger will create or strengthen dominant position on the
market. It is assumed that dominant position will create allocative
inefficiency, but it is crucial to evaluate whether the increase of pro-
duction efficiency due to the merger will offset losses of allocative
efficiency. 
Recommendation: Dominance test should be the standard for deci-
sion-making in merger control. Sub-statutory texts should precisely
specify the procedures for applying the dominance test. 
6.11. Decision making procedures 
Very important question regarding decision-making procedures is:
shall the issue of decision-making procedure on mergers be settled by
the Competition Law (statutory text) or though other acts or guide-
lines (sub-statutory texts)? 
It may not be vital which method is chosen, and can be a mixture
of both. For example, the EU Merger Regulation contains many of
the relevant deadlines and procedures, and this is backed up by
other implementing and interpretative regulations and notices.
Whatever is decided though, the guidelines should be consistent
and transparent, so that there is legal certainty, and so that compa-
nies are not discouraged from merging/undertaking economic
activity. 
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Nevertheless, everything that is crucial for the parties involved and
their actions (requirement to notifications etc,) and the obligations of
the competition authority towards the parties, the courts and the gen-
eral public should be specified in the statutory text. 
Recommendation: Decision-making procedure should be specified
in both statutory and sub-statutory texts, i.e. it must be a mixture of
both, but it would be very important to have as much as possible of
these procedures specified by the statutory text, particularly the obliga-
tions of the competition authority and the parties. 
6.12. Treatment of mergers already accomplished
Treatment of mergers already accomplished (carried out) before
the new merger control legislation is enacted is linked to a few rele-
vant questions: the rationale for an active treatment of these mergers
active and possible instruments of such treatment, as well as the
problem of the retroactive effects of the new competition law. In
principle, there are two options regarding mergers that have already
been accomplished:
a. Option A: Legal provision for active policy toward mergers
already carried out, i.e. towards non-competitive market struc-
tures. 
b. Option B: Lack of legal provision for active policy toward mergers
already carried out, i.e. towards non-competitive market struc-
tures. 
This dilemma is related to the general dilemma regarding the com-
petition policy attitude towards non-competitive market structure
whatever is the source of that structure. The solution of this dilemma
must be compatible with the general attitude of the competition policy
towards non-competitive structures. 
6.13. Mergers of companies with dominant position 
Since the dominance test has been recommended as the stan-
dard/criterion for merger control, a relevant question is the one
about the status of the mergers of the companies that already
acquired dominant position on the market. In other words, how to
deal with mergers where at least one company is already a dominant
firm? Does this mean that any merger of a firm that has dominant
position should be proclaimed per se illegal, or should mergers
involving firms with dominant position be examined in some spe-
cial way? 
The reasonable answer to these questions is that mergers of firms
with dominant position should not have any special treatment, let
alone be proclaimed per se illegal. Nevertheless, the probability for the
mergers those involve a company with dominant position to be chal-
lenged/blocked is bigger compared with the situation when no compa-
ny involved in merger has a dominant position. 
49Elements of competition policy (1)  merger control
7.  ELEMENTS OF COMPETITION POLICY (2)  STRUCTURES AND/OR
CONDUCT
7.1. The targets of competition policy 
One of the strategic questions regarding any competition policy is:
What should the target of the competition policy be: non-competitive
market structures or only firms non-competitive conduct, for example
abuse of non-competitive market structures? Taking into account the
target of competition policy, there is a difference between the US style
and EU style of competition policy. Contrary to the US style, EU style
competition legislation does not accommodate policies towards exist-
ing (inherited) non-competitive market structures. In general, there
are a few options regarding the targets of competition policy:
a. Option A: Targets should be both all non-competitive market
structures and all firms anti-competitive conduct. 
b. Option B: Targets should be some non-competitive market struc-
tures (those that are created by the firms conduct) and all firms
anti-competitive conduct. 
c. Option C: Targets should be only firms anti-competitive con-
duct. 
Taking into account the Yugoslav/Serbian institutional framework,
Option B is the most promising one, being a compromise between the
two extreme options, and enabling some activities within competition
policy regarding market structures, i.e. activities regarding behavior
towards creation, maintenance and strengthening of non-competitive
market structures (i.e. exclusionary abuse of dominance). 
7.2. Market structures as the target of competition policy 
Taking into account selected targets of competition policy, a relevant
question is to what extent new competition policy should take care of
non-competitive market structures (market power) and their creation,
irrespectively of the possible abuse of these structures (conduct of the
firms with market power)? In other words, should competition policy
be more aggressive dealing with the creation and strengthening of non-
competitive market structures (apart from the merger control that has
already been decided on as an integral part of the legislation)? There
are a few options regarding these issues: 
a. Option A: Merger control only. 
b. Option B: Merger control with additional mechanisms for dealing
with the creation of non-competitive structures, but applied
strictly to firms that have already obtained market dominance
(market power). 
c. Option C: Merger control with additional mechanisms for deal-
ing with creation of non-competitive structures, but applied to all
the firms irrespectively of whether they have already acquired a
dominant position on the market or not. 
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Option B is the best one, because, on the one hand, it can pre-
vent the creation of more non-competitive market structures than
Option A. On the other hand, Option B is superior to Option C
because it enables competition policy to be more focused, as this is
beneficial both it terms of diminishing room for possible abuses of
competition policy by the state and/or by competitors, reducing
the magnitude of the administrative burden of the competition
authority, as well as decreasing uncertainty for firms and private
entrepreneurs. 
Recommendation: Apart form merger control, competition poli-
cy/authority should deal with the creation of non-competitive market
structures but only by the firms that have already secured dominant
position on the market. 
7.3. Exclusionary behavior of the firms 
Since it was recommended that the creation of non-competitive
market structures should be dealt with only in the case of firms with
dominant position, the question arises whether conduct, for example
conduct (behavior) aiming at the creation of non-competitive market
structures (to monopolize) should be prohibited, i.e. should exclusion-
ary behavior be prohibited? For example: (a) creating barriers to entry,
(b) predatory pricing, (c) specific price discrimination aimed at harm-
ing the competitor. Should this type of conduct be proclaimed illegal as
methods of establishing dominant/monopolistic position, rather than
the abuse of it. 
a. Option A: To explicitly prohibit (proclaim illegal) these types of
conduct as such, irrespective of the abuse of dominant position. 
b. Option B: To deal with this conduct implicitly only as a part of
abuse of the dominant position. 
Option B is more promising because the creation of (more) non-
competitive market structure is exclusionary abuse of dominant posi-
tion. Although it does not create economic profit in a short run, it will
lead towards economic profit in the long run  exploitative abuse of the
(maintained and/or strengthened) dominant position. 
Since this conduct will be proclaimed illegal as a form of abuse of
dominant position (i.e. exclusionary abuse of the dominant position),
these provisions will only be applicable to firms with dominant posi-
tion. This is a reasonable solution in terms of focused competition pol-
icy, smaller administrative burden on the competition authority,
decreased probability of abuse of competition policy and decreased
uncertainty for firms and private entrepreneurs. It is, for example, of
paramount importance not to discourage price wars by over-enforce-
ment of the predatory pricing provision. By restricting the possibility
of that kind only to firms with dominant position, uncertainty for all
the other firms is already decreased. 
Recommendation: Exclusionary behavior of firms should be treated
only as a specific abuse of the dominant position of the firm. 
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7.4. Compulsory divestiture 
As to the issue of compulsory divestiture, the key question is: should
the legislation furnish the competition authority and the courts with
the right to impose compulsory divestiture of the firms that hold the
dominant position in order to enable the creation of competitive mar-
ket structure? The right to impose divestiture is a very powerful right
with far-reaching consequences. In principle, compulsory divestiture
can be imposed both on the firms that have already abused their dom-
inant position and the firms that have not done it yet. There are two
general options regarding compulsory divestiture: 
a. Option A: To incorporate a legal provision for compulsory
divestiture in the new competition legislation. Advantages of the
Option A right to impose divestiture are: (1) Aggressive com-
petition policy, taking care of the causes, not the consequences,
creating the ground for effective competition policy; (2)
Substantial non-market structures already exist on the domestic
markets, providing the ground for their abuse; (3) Some of these
structures (firms) are privately owned, so privatization can not
be considered as a vehicle for their divestiture; (4) Efficient out-
come regarding administrative burden to the competition
authority because after divestiture there is no need for close
monitoring of the dominant position and its abuse; (5) The
prospect for the Competition Law to be a legal basis for de-
monopolization and restructuring of existing natural monop-
olies. Drawbacks of the Option A right to impose divestiture
is: (1): Too great a legal power (authority) for the competition
authority, which is not capable (and will not become capable
quickly) of using these powers; (2) Generation of too great
uncertainty (risk) for all business decision makers (firms and
private entrepreneurs); (3) Decreased level of investments due
to the increased risk; (4) Small domestic market compared with
minimum efficient size of many firms, i.e. firms should be
allowed to grow; (5) There is no working (let alone efficient)
capital market as a precondition for divestiture. Without an effi-
cient capital market, there are severe technical problems regard-
ing divestiture implementation. 
b. Option B: Not to incorporate legal provision for compulsory
divestiture in new competition legislation. Advantages and draw-
backs are inverse to Option A.
Option B is definitely the better one, mainly due to the low level of
administrative capacity, i.e. institutional development, both in terms of
the competition authority and the capital market and decreased uncer-
tainty for the firms and private entrepreneurs. Furthermore, introduc-
tion of such a legal provision will contradict the principle of law
enforceability and will destroy competition policy credibility.
Nonetheless, the way should be found to overcome some drawbacks of
Option A in due course. 
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Recommendation: There should be no legal provision for compul-
sory divestiture, expect in the case of sanctions for the failure to notify
mergers or failure to notify accurately. 
8. ELEMENTS OF COMPETITION POLICY (3)  BARRIERS TO ENTRY
8.1. Statutory treatment of barriers to entry. 
As to the statutory treatment of barriers to entry, the first ques-
tion is: shall there be a specific statutory formulation, i.e. specific
provisions that the establishment of barriers to entry is
unlawful/prohibited, or shall there only be provisions relating to
illegal maintenance or abuse of a dominant position through anti-
competitive means? This dilemma is not directly linked to the advo-
cacy segment of the competition policy that will be the crucial
mechanism for impacting upon the public policies that create the
most important barriers to entry. Furthermore, education of the
public about barriers to entry and their effects is a crucial prerequi-
site for effective advocacy against policies that create and maintain
barriers to entry. There are two options regarding the statutory
treatment of barriers to entry: 
a. Option A: A specific statutory article on barriers to entry.
Advantages of this option are: (1) Sending a strong signal that the
paramount pillar of competition policy will be the removal of bar-
riers to entry (both short-term and long-term barriers) and that
the authorities are committed to establishing free entry; (2)
Education of civil servants and the business community about
modern competition policy; (3) Deterrent to some specific forms
(establishing barriers to entry) of anti-competitive behavior (4)
The possibility of deterring all firms from creating barriers to
entry, not only those with dominant position. Drawbacks of this
option are: (1) Increasing complexity of the competition legisla-
tion by adding another rather complicated provision; (2)
Problems regarding legal definition of barriers to entry; (3)
Majority of the barriers of entry are not created by the subjects of
the competition law, but by the state. (4) Possible deterrent to
pro-competitive behavior, i.e. legitimate behavior of non-domi-
nant firms.
b. Option B: No specific provision on barriers to entry, as barriers to
entry can differ widely across the different industries, but rather
there should not be any harm in having provisions relating to ille-
gal maintenance/strengthening and/or abuse of a dominant posi-
tion through anti-competitive means. Advantages of this option
are: (1) Avoiding the problem of legal definition of barriers to
entry, plus inverse drawbacks of Option A. Drawbacks of this
option are: (1) Only firms with dominant position will be legally
prohibited from creating barriers to entry; (2) There could be
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some ambiguity regarding some legitimate conduct, plus inverse
advantages of the Option A.
Main barriers to entry are either created by the state (administrative
and legal barriers), or are due to the technology or/and perfectly pro-
competitive behavior of the firms (side effects of this behavior). Only a
few barriers of entry are deliberately created by firms. In terms of com-
petition legislation enforcement, the competition authority should
deal only with the barriers to entry deliberately created by the firms.
Otherwise, the competition authority will end up filing cases against
the State as the major player in the field of barriers to entry without
much success, because the state as a regulator is not a subject of the
competition law (it is excluded from the law). Even in cases in which
the state is a subject of the law, the probability of wining the case is
rather low. 
Recommendation: Taking into account all the features of the barri-
ers to entry, Option B is definitely much more acceptable, hence creat-
ing barriers to entry can be specified as an exclusionary abuse of domi-
nant position (maintaining and strengthening of dominant position).
8.2. Legal definition of barriers to entry 
The legal definition of the barriers to entry should encompass all
activities by firms that provide obstacles for market entry complying
with the following criteria: (1) The barriers that put only some firms in
an unequal position; (2) That they are deliberately created by the firms
to stop new competitors entering the market; (3) That these barriers
harm competitors and/or create non-competitive market structure.
The definition should encompass both the barriers to entry of the new
firms (barrier to entry strictly speaking) and import, i.e. other forms of
entry to the market. 
Recommendation: Definition of barriers to entry should not be part
of the statutory, but rather the sub-statutory text, i.e. guidelines for the
competition authority. A non-exhaustive list (exampli causa) of the
barriers should be provided in the sub-statutory text. 
8.3. Legal standard for barriers to entry 
As to the legal standard of barriers to entry, the question is should
establishing barriers to entry be illegal per se or subject to case-by-case
analysis (the rule of reason)? There are two basic options and they
depend on the legal definition of the barriers:
a. Option A: Precise legal definition of the barriers and their per se
prohibition.
b. Option B: Flexible legal definition of the barriers and discre-
tionary analysis on a case-by-case basis (the rule of reason). 
Comment: Option B is definitely the better one, including flexible
legal definition of the barriers to entry and structured rule of reason for
their legal challenging. 
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8.4. Barriers to entry and the dominant firm
The question is whether creating barriers to entry should be prohib-
ited only in the case of dominant firms, or if this conduct should be
prohibited for all the firms. 
a. Option A: Creating barriers to entry prohibited for all the firms.
Advantages of this option are: (1) All firms are potential monopo-
lists; (2) A legal provision for aggressive competition policy that
will prevent creation of non-competitive behavior. Drawbacks of
this option are: (1) Huge administrative burden on the competi-
tion authority and other institutions in an undeveloped institu-
tional environment; (2) Decrease the ability to focus competition
policy on the major cases with substantial effects on competition,
i.e. economic efficiency; (3) Increased uncertainty for firms and
private entrepreneurs. 
b. Option B: Creating barriers to entry prohibited for dominant
firms only. Advantages and drawback of this option are inverse to
Option A.
Recommendation: Since barriers to entry are specified as a form of
abuse of dominant position, only Option B is acceptable (feasible).
Accordingly creating barriers to entry of firms with non-dominant
position will be considered as de minimis cases.  
8.5. Monitoring barriers to entry 
The crucial question is how shall competition authority monitor the
behavior of firms that create barriers to entry? Shall that be left to the
affected companies, and consumer associations harmed by these barri-
ers, while the competition authority only steps in to take action? Of
curse, this approach does not exclude ex officio provision. 
The answer to this question is closely linked to the legal provision
regarding actions towards firms with dominant position. Nonetheless,
formal registry of dominant firms, i.e. formal monitoring of the firms
with dominant position, should be avoided at any cost, due to the bad
international experience (particularly Russia). 
9. ELEMENTS OF COMPETITION POLICY (4)  RESTRICTIVE AND
OTHER AGREEMENTS
9.1. Control of restrictive agreements
As to the control of restrictive agreements, both horizontal and ver-
tical, the question is shall they all be presumed to be anti-competitive
or shall they be examined by the competition authority on a case-by-
case basis? 
It is obvious that not all agreements should be presumed anti-com-
petitive. The agreements do not have to be anti-competitive either
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because: (a) they have no effect on competition; or (b) because
although elements of the agreement restrict competition, these restric-
tions are outweighed by countervailing benefits. The presumption of
being competitive or anti-competitive may be different regarding the
type of agreement. Furthermore, some agreements could be per se pro-
hibited and others could be challenged on the legal standard of the rule
of reason. 
9.2. Different legal treatment of restrictive agreements 
The crucial question is, shall different types of agreements have differ-
ent legal treatment? Accordingly, there are two options regarding that:
a. Option A: Different types of agreements should have different
legal treatments. Advantages of this option are: (1) Efficient con-
trol of restrictive agreements and illegal behavior, (2) Smaller
administrative burden to the competition authority; (3)
Decreased uncertainty for the firms and private entrepreneurs.
The major drawback of this option is: (1) More complicated
statutory text. 
b. Option B: All types of agreements, regardless of the type, should
have the same legal treatment. Advantages and drawbacks of this
option are inverse to the Option A. 
There should be a different legal treatment of different types of
agreements. This arrangement will provide the foundation for efficient
legal treatment of the agreement and control of anti-competitive agree-
ments. Horizontal and vertical agreements should be treated different-
ly and possibly some groups of agreements within these types. The
main reason for the differentiation is that horizontal and vertical agree-
ments do not have the same probability for being restrictive or/and
anti-competitive. Furthermore, this arrangement reduces the adminis-
trative burden to the competition authority. 
Recommendation: There should be a different treatment of hori-
zontal and vertical agreements and perhaps differential treatment of
both horizontal and vertical agreements.
9.3. Differential division of the restrictive agreements
Two feasible schemes of differential treatment of agreements have
been suggested. Both groups have specific (different) legal provision
for horizontal and vertical agreements. 
9.3.1. Division of agreements into three groups
a. H1 group of agreements. These agreements are hard-core anti-
competitive horizontal agreements (cartel agreements). They
should be per se prohibited, clearly specified in the law in an
exhaustive list (numerus clausus) and should give rise to both
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fines and criminal sanctions. Only three types of agreement
should be encompassed by this group: price fixing (including
bid rigging), market division and agreements on maximum out-
put. There will be no exclusions (clearance), no exemptions and
no de minimis rule in the case of these agreements. The competi-
tion authority should only be involved in fact finding, not in
considering the consequences since these agreements are per se
prohibited. 
b. H2 group of agreements. This group consists of all other horizon-
tal agreements not belonging to the H1 group. They should not be
per se prohibited, but the rule of reason should be applied.
Detailed guidelines for the rule of reason procedure should be
specified in a sub-statutory text. The competition law could pro-
vide only a non-exhaustive list (indicative enumeration, i.e. exam-
pli causa) of the agreements and these agreements if proclaimed to
be illegal should give rise to fines only. There will be exclusions
(clearance), exemptions and de minimis rule in the case of these
agreements. The competition authority should consider the con-
sequences of these agreements since these agreements are not per
se prohibited. These agreements may be presumed to be anti-
competitive or pro-competitive. According to the presumption of
one or the other kind, the burden of proof should be with the
firms (parties) or the competition authority, respectively. 
c. V group of agreements. This group consists of all vertical agree-
ments. They should not be per se prohibited, but the rule of rea-
son should be applied. Effectively, no vertical agreement will be
considered to be per se prohibited. Detailed guidelines for the
rule of reason procedure should be specified in a sub-statutory
text. The competition law could provide only a non-exhaustive
list (indicative enumeration, i.e. exampli causa) of the agree-
ments and these agreements if proclaimed to be illegal should
give rise to fines only. There will be exclusions (clearance),
exemptions and de minimis rule in the case of these agreements 
the de minimis rule should be emphasized. The competition
authority should consider the consequences of these agreements
since they are not per se prohibited. All vertical agreements
should be presumed to be pro-competitive. According to the
presumption of that kind, the burden of proof should rest with
the competition authority. 
H1 group of agreements (cartel agreements) is the most important
and the most frequent anti-competitive behavior in Serbia. Dead-
weight loss created by such behavior is substantial. The origin of these
agreements is the old style socialist coordination of production
between the producers (partners, rather than competitors).
Accordingly, the suggested solution (specifying H1 agreements as per se
a criminal offense) provides a legal basis for focused competition poli-
cy, as well as for both harsh punishment and deterrence for such anti-
competitive behavior. 
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9.3.2. Division into four groups 
a. H1 group of agreements: same as in 9.3.1.
b. H2 group of agreements: same as in 9.3.1.
c. V1 group of agreements. This group consists only of vertical
agreements that are per se prohibited  for example, only exclu-
sive dealings, RPM and absolute territorial restraints could be
enumerated as these agreements. The competition law should
provide exhaustive enumeration (numerus clausus) of these
agreements. Illegal agreements are to be treated as offenses
only. There will be exclusions (clearance), exemptions and de
minimis rule in the case of these agreements  de minimis rule
should be emphasized. De minimis rule can be emphasized by
specifying that only firms with dominant position can be con-
sidered violators. The burden of proof should be on the compe-
tition authority. 
d. V2 group of agreements. This group consists of all vertical agree-
ments not included in V1. They should not be per se prohibited,
but the rule of reason should be applied. Detailed guidelines for
the rule of reason procedure should be specified in a sub-statuto-
ry text. The competition law could provide an indicative list (enu-
meration) and these agreements if proclaimed to be illegal should
be treated as offenses only. There will be exclusions (clearance),
exemptions and de minimis rule in the case of these agreements 
de minimis rule should be emphasized. De minimis rule can be
emphasized by specifying that only firms with dominant position
can be considered violators. The competition authority should
consider the consequences of these agreements since they are not
per se prohibited. All the V2 vertical agreements should be pre-
sumed to be pro-competitive. According to the presumption of
that kind, the burden of proof should lie with the competition
authority. 
The only essential difference between the two suggested divisions is
the introduction of per se prohibited vertical agreements in the second
classification. Hence the difference can be specified as:
a. Option A (classification 9.3.1.): Provision of the rule of reason for
all vertical agreements, without any vertical agreement to be per se
prohibited. Advantages of this option are: (1) More room for free
entrepreneurship, i.e. increased economic freedom for private
entrepreneurs; (2) Fostering import based inter-brand competi-
tion; (3) Intra-brand competition is still not a significant problem
on the Serbian market, and can be dealt with on rule of reason
grounds; (4) Simple and straightforward solution. Drawbacks of
this option are: (1) Increased possible uncertainty for firms and
private entrepreneurs; (2) Lack of compatibility with the EU regu-
lation/legal practice with some vertical agreements being specified
as per se illegal; (3) Possibility that some exclusionary practices
cannot be proclaimed illegal. 
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b. Option B (classification 9.3.2.): Provision for per se prohibition of
some vertical agreements. Advantages and drawback are inverse
to Option b.
Option A is definitely preferable, particularly taking into account that
the danger of vertical restraints to competition in Serbia is not so big, and
it can be challenged by the rule of reason approach to vertical agreements
and/or under challenging abuse of dominant position. Accordingly there
is no need for per se prohibition of any vertical agreement. 
9.4. Burden of proof and presumed effects of the horizontal
agreements 
The issue is with whom the burden of proof should rest and what is
the presumed effect on competition of the H2 group of horizontal
agreements? It is very important to stress that the issue is only the
character of presumed effects on competition of H2 group horizontal
agreements, because only in that case of H2 horizontal agreements
will the rule of reason be applied. H1 agreements are per se prohibited
and no rule of reason will be applied. There are two feasible options:
a. Option A: H2 horizontal agreements are presumed to be anti-
competitive and the burden of proof should be on the firms (par-
ties). Advantages and drawbacks of this option are inverse to those
of Option B. 
b. Option B: H2 horizontal agreements are presumed to be pro-
competitive and the burden of proof should be on the competi-
tion authority. Advantages of this option are: (1) Providing incen-
tives for pro-competitive horizontal agreements; (2) Decreased
uncertainty for firms and private entrepreneurs; (3) Incentives for
more focused enforcement of the competition policy legislation
by the competition authority, i.e. focusing their enforcement
activities towards more non-controversial cases like H1 horizontal
agreements. The major drawback of this option is: (1) Substantial
administrative burden to the competition authority. 
Option B is much better option, because it will enable more focused
competition policy and decreased uncertainty for the firms and private
entrepreneurs. Although substantial administrative burden could be
prima facie treated as a drawback of Option B, it is an effective incen-
tive to the competition authority to focus on enforcement in the H1
area, i.e. avoid administratively demanding and controversial chal-
lenges in the H2 area of agreements. 
Recommendation: The burden of proof should be with the compe-
tition authority in all cases of H2 horizontal agreements. 
9.5. Burden of proof and presumed effects of the vertical agreement 
The issue is to whom the burden of proof should be allocated and
what is the presumed effect to competition of vertical agreements? The
issue of burden of proof and presumed effects of vertical agreements
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on competition should be linked to the legal standards for examination
of vertical agreements  all of them should be considered and chal-
lenged by the rule of reason. 
a. Option A: Vertical agreements are presumed to be anti-competi-
tive and the burden of proof should be on the firms (parties).
Advantages and drawbacks of this option are inverse to those of
Option B. 
b. Option B: Vertical agreements are presumed to be pro-competi-
tive and the burden of proof should be on the competition
authority. Advantages of this option are: (1) Providing incentives
for pro-competitive vertical agreements; (2) Decreased uncertain-
ty for the firms and private entrepreneurs; (3) Incentives for more
focused enforcement of the competition policy legislation by the
competition authority, i.e. focusing their enforcement activities
on more non-controversial cases. The major drawback of this
option is: (1) Substantial administrative burden to the competi-
tion authority. 
Option B is better, because it will enable more focused competition
policy and decreased uncertainty for firms and private entrepreneurs.
Although substantial administrative burden could be prima facie treat-
ed as drawback of Option B, it is an effective incentive to the competi-
tion authority to focus on enforcement in non-controversial cases of
restrictive vertical agreements and straightforward cases of horizontal
agreements. 
Recommendation: The burden of proof should rest with the com-
petition authority in all cases of vertical agreements. 
9.6. Notification of the agreements. 
The issue is whether the notification of the agreements should be vol-
untary or compulsory? If a compulsory notification of the agreement is
to be introduced, what should be the criteria (thresholds) for agree-
ments to be notified and examined? Furthermore, a method must be
devised to obtain relevant information on agreements that will never be
notified (H1 agreements) due to the lack of incentives to the parities. As
to the character of notification, there are two possible options:
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H1 H2 V
Legal standard Per se Rule of reason Rule of reason
Burden of proof Authority Authority Authority
Liability Criminal, fines, Fines, remedies Fines, remedies
remedies and nullity and nullity and nullity
De minimis No Yes (numeric) Yes (dominance)
Exhaustive list Yes No No
Table 1. 
Survey of the treatment of restrictive agreements
a. Option A: Compulsory notification of agreements (with exceptions
 below threshold). An advantage of this option is: (1) Collecting
huge information on economic activities; that could be very useful
for competition policy and other economic policies. Drawbacks of
this option are: (1) The administrative burden on the competition
authority will be immense  unbearable even for a very developed
competition authority; (2) The agreements that are most interest-
ing, i.e. cartel agreements, will not be notified one way or the other;
(3) Increased uncertainty and transaction costs (administrative
burden) for the firms and private entrepreneurs; (4) With such an
administrative burden of the competition authority, the major
breaches will escape detection; (5) There are substantial problems
as to specifying a suitable threshold for compulsory notification. 
b. Option B: Voluntary notification. Advantages and drawbacks of
voluntary notification are inverse to the Option A.
Voluntary notification along the EU policy line is that agreements
where companies want clearance from the European Commission can
be notified  in such cases, companies can either seek negative clearance
(where the presumption is that the agreement has no negative effect on
competition, i.e. they are not restrictive), or an exemption (where
although elements of the agreement may restrict competition, the pre-
sumption is that these are outweighed by countervailing benefits). Such
exemptions can either be individual exemptions granted by the
Commission, or exemptions which fall under the umbrella of the group
exemption regimes (e.g. technology transfer agreements, franchising
agreements, etc.) where general guidelines are laid out for what is and is
not permissible). There is no obligation on companies to notify their
agreements and companies therefore do so where they want a confirma-
tion from the Commission that they are not in breach of the law. 
Recommendation: Compulsory notification (Option A) is definite-
ly out of the question; Option B is the only remaining (viable) option 
voluntary notification. 
Nonetheless, there is a dilemma regarding the legal obligation of the
competition authority to respond to the notification  whatever the
response will be: a letter of confirmation or the proclamation of the
agreement null and void. That dilemma can be considered from the
deadline position  if there is a deadline for the competition authority
to answer the notification with one of the mentioned answers.
Accordingly, there are two options:
a. Option A: there should be a deadline for the competition author-
ity to provide the answer. If there is no answer from the competi-
tion authority within the deadline the agreement would be con-
sidered cleared  silence means consent. Advantages of this option
are: (1) Decreased uncertainty for the firms and private entrepre-
neurs; (2) Incentives for the competition authority to examine the
notified agreements; (3) Increased information base and the
knowledge of the competition authority regarding the types of
agreements and their legal language. Drawbacks of this option are:
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(1) Huge administrative burden for the competition authority;
(2) Due to the huge burden, incentives for superficial (only for-
mal, not substantial) analysis of the agreements. 
b. Option B: there should be no deadline whatsoever for the compe-
tition authority to provide the answer. Advantages and drawbacks
of this option are inverse to Option A. 
In general, advantages and drawbacks of both options are rather bal-
anced. Further analysis should provide more information on the bene-
fits and costs of both options. Since some legal position must be taken,
the balance of arguments is slightly if favor of Option A, i.e. establish-
ing a deadline for the competition authority to respond to the notifica-
tion of agreement. 
Recommendation: There should be a legal obligation of the competi-
tion authority to respond to the agreement notification within 60 days. 
As to the timing of notification, there will be two cases of notifica-
tions that will appear before the competition authority:
 Notification of agreements that have been concluded but still not
enforced (i.e. the enforcement of the agreement has not started yet). 
 Notification of the agreements that have been both concluded and
enforced (i.e. the enforcement of the agreement has already started
before the notification). 
Special care should be taken about safeguarding the potential abuse
of the notification right for the companies in the second case. 
9.7. Horizontal agreements vs. horizontal mergers
It should be examined whether the horizontal restrictive agreements
(cartels) are, from the public policy or social welfare prospective, better
or worse case than horizontal mergers. Furthermore, the question is
what are the legal solutions that create incentives to horizontal mergers
as substitutes for horizontal agreements (cartels)?
On the one hand, cartels (H1 horizontal agreements) are inherently
non-stabile structures, so an established cartel is not very likely to last
for a long time. Contrary to that, mergers are very stabile and they pet-
rify non-competitive market structures. On the other hand, mergers
have some advantages because, contrary to cartels, some economies
(economy of scale, for example) can materialize. It is essential that the
parties do not substitute one behavior to the other: for example, to
evade cartel control by merging. Accordingly, it is necessary that no
loophole exist in the legislation. Such a loophole would be, for exam-
ple, the lack of control of integration, so cartels under risk of detection
and punishment will decide to go for merger and solve their problems
by creating a problem for the consumers/customers.  
9.8. Examination of vertical agreements 
The question is what the principles of examining vertical agreements
and treating vertical agreements as barriers to entry should be. There is
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a need to establish a careful approach regarding vertical agreements,
especially when it comes to import and competition stemming from
the import.
Harmful vertical agreements (i.e. anti-competitive vertical agree-
ments with adverse effects on economic efficiency and welfare) are
only those that have horizontal effects. The crucial prerequisite (neces-
sary but not sufficient condition) for vertical agreements to be harmful
is substantial market power (dominant position) of at least one of the
parties. In other words if there is no substantial market power of the
parties, vertical agreement cannot be harmful. This position gives
grounds for rejecting per se prohibition of some vertical agreements
(RPM), but rather the application of the rule of reason. 
10. ELEMENTS OF COMPETITION POLICY (5)  MARKET DEFINITION
AND MARKET POWER
10.1. Market definition 
It is very important to correctly specify the relevant market as
opposed to a single market. All pertinent elements for the specification
of relevant market should be carefully considered. Furthermore, the
question is whether the issues of relevant market should be regulated
by statutory or sub-statutory acts? 
Relevant market definition should be based on three basic elements:
 product market (demand and, perhaps, supply substitutability);
 geographic market (transportation and transaction costs magni-
tude/share);
 import component (import to the domestic market should be cal-
culated as a part of that market). 
Demand and supply substitutability are both, in principle, pertinent
for relevant market definition. As to the introduction of supply substi-
tutability, there are two options regarding that: (a) including supply
substitutability and (b) not including supply substitutability, i.e. using
only demand substitutability for market definition. For the rather
small Serbian market it is better not to include supply substitutability
in the market definition, particularly taking into account that much of
the supply substitutability will come form import, i.e. it is virtually
impossible to obtain relevant information regarding supply substi-
tutability. Accordingly, supply substitutability should not be a part of
market definition, but should be included in the more complex proce-
dure of identification of market dominance. 
The basic elements of the definition of the market and criteria for
specifying the relevant market, i.e. features of the notion of relevant
market should be included in the Competition Law (i.e. statutory text).
Procedures for establishing relevant market should be a part of a sub-
statutory text (Guidelines for the competition authority decision-mak-
ing process). 
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10.2. Market power (dominant position) definition
It is crucial to specify the way in which market dominance is identi-
fied by the competition authority. Furthermore, what happens when
the market dominance of a firm is established? What are then the pow-
ers of the competition authority (strengthened supervision, monitor-
ing companys behavior, preferably without a formal list of firms with
dominant position)? To what extent shall all these issues be regulated
by statutory, as opposed to sub-statutory texts?
A specified (40%) market share should be taken as a prerequisite
(necessary condition) of market power (dominant position), i.e. no
firm whose market share is less than the specified threshold can be clas-
sified as a firm with dominant position. Accordingly the specified mar-
ket share (40%) should be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for
establishing the dominant position of a firm. 
If the market share of the firm exceeds the specified one (40%),
other criteria are to be applied for proclaiming market power, i.e. dom-
inant position of the firm: barriers to entry (scale, character and dura-
bility), potential competition (domestic or international), i.e. supply-
side substitutability, and potential countervailing strength of buyers, as
well as other relevant features of the market/market power. In essence,
the procedure is to identify whether a company has market power, i.e.
whether it can exert this power by acting independently of its competi-
tors and customers.
If market dominance is identified, then the dominant position itself
is not prohibited, i.e. there is no liability whatsoever. It is only the
abuse of this dominance that should be prohibited. Accordingly, the
competition authority should monitor the behavior of the firms with
dominant position more closely than all other firms. There should be
no formal monitoring (i.e. no legal obligation for the competition
authority to monitor dominant firms behavior), nor the list (register)
of the firms with dominant position. 
There should be no legal provision for challenging collective (joint)
dominance, since the concept of collective dominance is rather vague
(even in the EU legislation), so it is difficult to provide a good and
unambiguous legal definition. Accordingly, there is room for the abuse
of the concept, so it should not be made part of competition legislation. 
11. ELEMENTS OF COMPETITION POLICY (6)  ABUSE OF DOMINANT
POSITION
11.1. Concepts of the abuse of dominant position
There are two distinct concepts of the abuse of dominant position.
Both of them can be established within the framework of the Article 82
of the Treaty of Rome. Accordingly there are a few options to be
included in the Yugoslav/Serbian legislation. 
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a. Option A: Exploitative abuse of dominant position, i.e. earning
economic profit in the short-run. 
b. Option B: Exclusionary abuse of dominant position, i.e. main-
taining strengthening and further developing dominant position
(restraining competition) to increase market power and to earn
greater economic profit in the long-run. 
c. Option C: Combined exploitative abuse and exclusionary abuse
of dominant position. 
Option C is the best solution, because it can encompass both types
of behavior. These two types in behavior should be explicitly separated
in the legislation, i.e. legal definition of the abuse of dominant position
aimed at the appropriation of short-term profit, on the one hand, and
the abuse of dominant position aimed at the creation of non-competi-
tive market structures like predatory pricing, barriers to entry, tie-in
sales, etc., on the other.
11.2. Elements of the abuse of dominant position
There should be two separate lists of indicative enumeration of the
abuses of dominant position (non-exhaustive list, i.e. exampli causa)
leaving room for prohibition of other types of abuse of dominant posi-
tion. Indicative enumeration should be more elaborated than Article
82 of the EEC treaty, following some of the recent CEE countries legis-
lation like, for example, Hungarian legislation. 
a. The indicative numeration (exampli causa) in the case of exploita-
tive abuse should consist only of:
 pricing that is not cost based
 reducing output
b. The indicative numeration (exampli causa) in the case of exclu-
sionary abuse should consist at least of:
 pricing that is not cost based
 creation of barrier to entry
 price and other discrimination
 tie-in sales
The most important abuse of the dominant position that is usually
specified as unfair pricing should be reformulated as pricing that is
not cost based. Such a formulation enables prohibition of standard
monopolistic behavior (prices above the costs) in the case of exploita-
tive abuse as well as predatory pricing (prices below the costs) in the
case of exclusionary abuse. The type of the costs (marginal, average,
average incremental, etc.) as well as the procedure for cost estimations
should be specified in the sub-statutory text (guidelines). 
Price and other discrimination and tie-in sales should be considered
only as exclusionary abuse of dominant position. Since in the case of
abuses of dominant position there are only indicative (non-exhaustive)
lists for both exploitative and exclusionary abuses, there is room that,
say, price discrimination can be found illegal also in the case of exploita-
tive abuse. Nonetheless, the decision-makers should be given a signal,
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by the careful wording of the statutory text, that price discrimination is,
first and foremost, an exclusionary abuse of dominant position.
The competition authority should be focused on the exclusionary
abuse of dominant position rather than exploitative. That will prevent
the competition authority from becoming the price control authority
as it has happened in many cases in CEE countries, with a lot of bad
effects regarding competition policy enforcement. 
The prerequisite for abuse of dominant position is proving the exis-
tence of dominant position. If there is no dominant position, no firm
can be charged for the behavior, i.e. for its abuse of dominant position.
Burden of proof rests with the competition authority. 
11.3. The legal standard of the abuse of dominant position 
The legal standard for challenging abuses of dominant position is
always the rule of reason. The burden of proof is with the competition
authority, i.e. the authority must prove that the party has abused its
dominant position and the adverse, anti-competitive effects, i.e. that
adverse effects to economic efficiency and welfare occurred. 
12. THE SCOPE OF THE LAW
12.1. Self-standing Competition Law 
Basically, there are two options for the competition legislation that
are based on: (a) self-standing Competition Law, i.e. a specialized
piece of legislation and (b) legal provision for competition policy
based on a broader piece of legislation like Commercial Trading
Law, integrating competition policy legislation with other policies,
protection of fair trading, for example. Accordingly there are two
options:
a. Option A: Self-standing Competition Law. Advantages of this
option are: (1) More specific and precise legal formulation as a
suitable legal basis for focused and efficient competition policy;
(2) Legal foundation for specialized institution (competition
authority) that will enforce the competition law, hence increased
probability for specialization and more efficient enforcement of
the legislation. The major drawback of this option is: (1) Possible
duplication of institutional capacity (competition authority and
the office of fair trading). 
b. Option B: Broad law including other commercial legislation (Fair
Trading Law, etc.). Advantages of this option are: (1) Almost
every relevant market behavior is considered in one piece of legis-
lation; (2) Good publicity for the authority/institution with cases
of protecting consumers. Drawbacks of this option are: (1) The
possibility for the legislation to be diluted/compromised; (2)
room for an inefficient, unspecialized institution/authority. 
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Option A is definitely the better one, particularly taking into account
domestic legal tradition. i.e. the fact that existing competition law
(Antimonopolski zakon) is a self-standing law and that a specialized
competition authority already exists. 
Recommendation: A self-standing competition law should be draft-
ed. An enquiry should be made if there is an urgent need for amend-
ment to the existing Fair Trading Law (Zakon o trgovini) to bring it
in line with the draft of the new Competition Law, or even the drafting
of a new Fair Trading Law. 
12.2. Natural monopolies and their regulation 
One of the most controversial issues of competition policy is the
treatment of natural monopolies, particularly network industries. The
questions are: what should be the regulatory framework for economic
regulation of these industries and should the industries under econom-
ic regulation be liable under Competition Law? There are a few possible
options regarding these issues:
a. Option A: Natural monopolies (regulated industries) to be
exempted only from some provisions of the competition legisla-
tion and regulated by other pieces of special legislation (lex spe-
cialis) that will provide the basis for the operations and economic
regulation of these industries. 
b. Option B: Natural monopolies (regulated industries) to be
exempted from all provisions of the competition legislation and
regulated by other pieces of special legislation (lex specialis) that
will provide the basis for the operations and economic regulation
of these industries.
c. Option C: Natural monopolies (regulated industries) to be
exempted from provisions of the competition legislation by block
exemptions given by the competition authority. 
Option A looks good, particularly taking into account that the possi-
bility of regulatory capture (by the regulated industries) is reduced
because there is a general purpose competition authority that takes
care even of the regulated industries, i.e. some aspects of their behav-
ior. Furthermore, restructuring and deregulation of the regulated
industries is more likely under the continued jurisdiction of the com-
petition authority. 
Natural monopolies should be regulated according to special legis-
lation (lex specialis) for the industries considered to be natural
monopolies. These pieces of legislation will provide the legal basis for
economic regulation, particularly regarding the methods of economic
regulation and institutions (authorities) that will enforce economic
regulation. Such a solution will be quite consistent with the competi-
tion legislation/policy in terms of the economic basis of economic reg-
ulation. For example, economic regulation will enable pricing in these
industries to be cost based, hence no abuse of dominant position will
occur. Furthermore, competition legislation will be enforced by the
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competition authority on all other activities of the natural monopo-
lies, i.e. operations of these firms/industries that are not covered by
special legislation. 
Recommendation: Natural monopolies (regulated industries)
should be exempted from some provisions of the competition legisla-
tion by special laws (lex specialis), applying the principle: one industry
 one special law. 
12.3. State aid 
One of the strategic dilemmas regarding the new competition policy
and legislation is whether state aid issues should be integrated into the
new competition legislation or should new, separate state aid legisla-
tion be designed and enforced? Accordingly, there are two options:
a. Option A: Integration of state aid into competition legislation.
Advantages of this option are: (1) Obvious link between preserva-
tion of competition and its undermining by state aid; (2) Principal
consistency with EU legislation, particularly taking into account
potential political pressure within the SAP. Drawbacks of this
option are: (1) State aid provisions within the competition legisla-
tion make little sense  state aid is provided by the government
and its prohibition is to be enforced by the governmental body
specialized in other area  competition authority; (2) Possible
strong pressure from the executive branch of the government on
the competition authority, so state aid control could not be effec-
tively enforced; (3) Such pressure would be against the whole
competition policy, i.e. competition authority, hence affecting
other, much more important segments of competition policy
(antitrust policy, strictly speaking) as a negative side effect. 
b. Option B: Separate state aid legislation. Advantages and draw-
backs are inverse to Option A. Furthermore, separate state aid leg-
islation will enable the creation of a consistent piece of legislation
with the best enforcement mechanism, although at some cost in
the possible loss of a link between competition policy and the dis-
torting aspect of state aid. A further advantage of separate state aid
piece of legislation is that, although it is not thoroughly consistent
with the EU legislation it is accepted by the EC as a suitable insti-
tutional arrangement for candidate countries. 
The state aid issue is certainly politically and economically very
important. Within the EU competition policy framework and accord-
ing to EU terminology, competition policy comprises antitrust law and
state aid law, and the prominence and importance of state aid has
grown in the EU in the last ten years. State aid control is clearly a fea-
ture that distinguishes EU competition policy from the competition
policy of other countries. Taking into account the SAP and eventual
EU membership, its is not enough to integrate a few lines on state aid
into the basic competition law; State aid requires its own independent
legal framework. Central and East European countries in transition,
68 New Competition Policy: A Policy Paper
some of them EU membership candidates, have adopted separate com-
petition and state aid laws. 
The state aid issue has been and will be a politically very sensitive
subject. Hence it should be developed very carefully and from the
beginning of the process the relevant ministry and the whole cabinet
should be included in the process. It is a far better solution to have sep-
arate state aid legislation that will be designed in due course, taking
into account the advances in the privatization process and the SAP. It is
better to have a separate institution (authority) that will take care of
state aid implementation. 
Recommendation: The draft of the new competition Law should
not have provisions for control of state aid. Possible future changes of
the competition legislation will depend on the independent develop-
ment of state aid control legislation and relations between state aid
control and competition policy. 
12.4. Competition legislation and public enterprises 
Public enterprises are rather widespread in the Serbian economy,
being involved not only in the case of natural monopolies, but also
operating in competitive industries. Many public enterprises operate at
the local level, being under effective control of local public authorities
and frequently protected by these authorities by creating administra-
tive barriers to entry. 
The EU position regarding public companies (enterprises), publicly
backed companies or public bodies which are economic operators, is
that it should be a basic principle that these bodies should not be
exempt from competition law. Because of the significant impact of the
public enterprises on the Serbian economy, there may therefore need
to be transition periods for certain areas, depending on the nature of
the whole process of liberalization and reform/restructuring of the
public companies. 
Recommendation: There should be no special provision in the com-
petition law/legislation regarding public companies (enterprises), nor
should they be exempted from the competition legislation, i.e. public
enterprises should be subjects of the competition legislation. The need
for substantial reform of the public enterprises legislation should be
underlined in some other policy documents. The advocacy role of the
competition authority is very important regarding reform of public
policy towards public companies, i.e. reform of the public companies
conduct and regarding their restructuring (with possible subsequent
privatization). 
12.5. Exemption mechanism 
The only exemption mechanism should be special legislation (lex
specialis) by which some industries (i.e. companies in these industries)
will be exempted from some provisions of the competition law. It is
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very important that special legislation should exempt these indus-
tries/companies only from some provisions of the competition legisla-
tion, not from the entire competition legislation. The activities of the
companies that are exempt from some provisions of the competition
legislation should be only these that are regulated by the special law
whose provisions are enforced by authorities other than the competi-
tion authority. 
13. THE SUBJECTS OF THE COMPETITION LAW
13.1. Subjects of the Law
Who should be the subjects of the law? Basically, there are two rele-
vant options regarding that:
a. Option A: EU style subjects: undertakings, covering any collec-
tion of resources to carry our economic activities. 
b. Option B: US style subjects: every person with exceptions pro-
vided by the competition law itself and other pieces of legislation. 
The sorting out of the dilemma depends on the type of the liability
and the sanctions of the competition legislation. The US style defini-
tion directly enables criminal liability/sanctions to be implemented.
Perhaps that the EU style definition should be amended slightly to
enable every natural person in charge of decision-making within
undertakings be liable to criminal liability/sanctions. 
There should be a notion that all legal persons (entities), their asso-
ciations as well as private persons and their associations directly or
indirectly involved in commercial activities or activities that have an
impact on commercial activities should be subjects of the competition
law. Serbian legal doctrine should be taken into account that enables
executives in charge of a legal person to be prosecuted in criminal
cases. Special care should be taken to ensure that all the officials of the
legal person involved in breaching the law are liable to the criminal
sanctions, not chief executives alone. This is very important as leverage
for leniency policy that will provide incentives for all those involved to
provide insiders information on cartels. 
The state should be a subject of the competition law in so far as it is
indirectly or directly involved in commercial activities. Nonetheless,
the state should not be subject of the competition law in its capacity as
regulator, i.e. activities of creation and enforcement of the rules.
Advocacy to promote competition should be the main mechanism of
competition policy towards the state as regulator, not enforcement of
the competition legislation. 
13.2. Foreign companies as subjects of domestic competition law
There is no doubt that the effects doctrine should be adopted and
that foreign companies (undertakings, i.e. legal persons) should be
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subject to domestic competition legislation. The competition authority
should be able to act (should have powers) with regard to any compa-
ny (undertaking), irrespective of whether it is domestically or foreign
owned or located (in terms of domicile), subject to its actions having
an effect on Yugoslav/Serbian territory, i.e. the Yugoslav/Serbian
domestic market. This is the basic principle of competition legislation
in both the EU and the US, as well as other countries and has been con-
firmed many times.
Recommendation: There should be a legal provision that foreign
undertakings (companies) are subjects of domestic competition law so
far as their activities create effects on the domestic market. 
13.3. Exemptions from competition law 
In the EU, competition law is applicable to undertakings. An
undertaking is any entity engaged in economic activity and offering
goods and services on an economic market, i.e. legal entities involved
in commercial activities. In practice therefore, undertakings are com-
panies, partnerships, sole traders, associations etc. They can naturally
include public bodies/enterprises that are engaged in economic activity
and offering goods and services on the market, i.e. the state is included
in so far as it is directly or indirectly involved in commercial activities,
but not as the regulator of commercial activities. All other legal entities
and individuals, i.e. the conduct of legal and natural persons in non-
commercial activities are not subject to the competition law. 
Recommendation: Due to possible legal controversy, two sec-
tors should be explicitly exempted/excluded from the competition
legislation: 
 trade unions, in their activities regarding the collective barraging
process;
 sports association in their activities of organizing athletic compe-
tition.
Both exemptions should be specified on the exhaustive list (numerus
clausus) as paragraph of the Competition Law itself. 
14. SANCTIONS OF THE NEW COMPETITION LAW
14.1. Sanctions at disposal of the competition authority and the
courts
There is no controversy that remedies (i.e. the end of illegal con-
duct) and fines should be the sanctions at disposal both of the compe-
tition authority and the courts. Nonetheless, the crucial dilemma is
whether criminal liability should be introduced in the new competi-
tion legislation. Accordingly there are two feasible options, one is the
set of sanctions without criminal sanctions, and the other includes
criminal sanctions.  
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a. Option A: Sanctions without criminal liability:
 remedies  an end to the illegal conduct
 civil sanctions  proclaim the agreement null and void; 
 fines on the subjects of the competition law  these should be of
sufficient magnitude to produce a significant deterrent effect; 
 no criminal liability whatsoever.
Advantages of this option are: (1) Full consistency with existing EU
competition policy/legislation; (2) Rather simple legislation enforce-
ment, because enforcement in the case of criminal liability is much
more complicated. The major drawback of this option is: (1)
Decreased deterrent effect of the sanctions. 
b. Option B: Sanctions including criminal liability: 
 remedies  as in option A;
 civil sanction  as in option A
 fines to the subject of the competition law  as in option A;
 criminal liability/sanctions for company officials in the case of the
most severe breaches competition law, only in the case of per se pro-
hibited H1 agreements  all company officials breaching the law
should be liable to criminal sanctions, not only chief executives. 
Advantages of this option are: (1) Strong deterrent effect, especially
in Serbia where deterrent effect of fines is not big, particularly taking
into account long and inefficient judicial procedures; (2) Criminal sanc-
tions are consistent with domestic legal tradition of competition legisla-
tion; (3) Although criminal sanctions are not strictly speaking consis-
tent with existing EU competition policy/legislation, some of the EU
countries national legislation provides room for criminal sanctions 
criminal liability is not prohibited with the EU. The major drawback of
this option is: (1) Rather complicated enforcement of the sanctions,
particularly taking into account that different authorities will be includ-
ed and that different standards for the burden of proof must be applied. 
Remedies and fines are commonly used in all modern competition
legislation across the World. Only some of the national legislation pro-
vides legal grounds for criminal liability and related sanctions.
Although existing Yugoslav competition legislation (Antimonopolski
zakon) provides for criminal liability, that legal provision has not yet
been enforced no criminal prosecution has as yet been undertaken.
One of the most important considerations of including criminal liabil-
ity in the legislation is whether there is a judicial capacity/will for effi-
cient enforcement of criminal liability.
Recommendation: In principle, all sanctions including criminal
should be at the disposal of the competition authority/courts. There is no
need for any change to be made in the Penal Code (criminal legislation). 
14.2. The implementation of sanctions 
Criminal sanctions should be reserved only for the most severe
offenses against competition legislation, only in very limited cases of
actions that are per se prohibited, i.e. only in the case of the H1 group
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of horizontal agreements. These offenses should also (simultaneous-
ly) be subject of fines and civil liability. All the breaches of the com-
petition law other than H1 should be subjects to fines only (alongside
civil sanctions). 
As to the procedure of criminal sanctions enforcement, there should
be strict collaboration between the competition authority and the public
attorney, who should be the only one that can file competition law crim-
inal cases before the court. The investigation powers of the public attor-
ney should be the same as in the investigation of all criminal cases. The
role of the competition authority will be substantial because the authori-
ty is the only institution that has the specialized knowledge (know-how)
relevant for the investigation of breaches of competition law. As in all
other criminal cases, the decision-making body is the court. 
As to the procedure of non-criminal sanctions, all decisions are
made by the competition authority as a quasi-judicial body. The judi-
cial revew should be exercised through the courts.  
It should be feasible to hold a company (legal person) liable under
civil law for an infringement, and at the same time to hold officials of
that company criminally responsible. If a H1 type of horizontal agree-
ment breach of competition law occurs, that means that there is a pos-
sibility that, at the same time, fines (legal person) and criminal sanc-
tions (legal entitys executives and officials) are imposed. There
should be two separate procedures for law enforcement, because pos-
sible stumbling blocks in the criminal procedure should not slow
down the rest of the procedure. Nonetheless, information on the case
must be shared. 
As regards EU standards, whilst it is the case that there are no crimi-
nal sanctions for anti-trust abuses at the EU level, this does not neces-
sarily mean that criminal sanctions at a national level under EU com-
petition laws are inconsistent. For example, the UK and Ireland have
the possibility of criminal sanctions in their domestic competition
laws. Therefore, it appears that as regards liability, different concepts
can co-exist, and that what is important is that the basic principles of
competition law are similar across all the EU Member States. It is rea-
sonable to assume that the same approach will be taken for the candi-
date countries and the countries involved in the SAP. 
14.3. Settlements and leniency 
It is naturally the case that once a preliminary yet credible conclu-
sion has been reached by a competition authority that there has been a
potential breach of competition rules, the threat of sanctions can be an
effective way of bringing the abuses to an end. It may be the case that
the likely abuse is not one of the more serious ones, and therefore that
pursuing the case further would constitute a disproportionate use of
administrative resources. If this is the case, then it may be worthwhile
to enter into a settlement with the company in question, or for the
company to offer a formal undertaking to the competition authority,
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under which the company pledges that it will cease and not repeat the
conduct in question. 
In the EU, such undertakings do not have any formal legal standing,
although they can prove very valuable  it is likely that the company
will take any such undertaking very seriously as any breach of it will
result in a harder subsequent position from the competition authority
and hence a more serious sanctions. 
Very serious breaches of competition law should generally always be
pursued more officially (i.e. with official decisions and sanctions) as a
point of principle, and as precedent/example, particularly in FR
Yugoslavia/Serbia where competition policy is young, and there can be
a useful deterrent effect to others. Accordingly, such a policy should
not be abused, i.e. a sufficient number of cases must be pursued offi-
cially. The competition authority should have the discretionary right to
decide in which cases a settlement can be a useful way to close the case.
Nonetheless, monitoring of the use of that right is essential, i.e. there
must be clear disclosure of all pertinent information (for example, in
the annual report). 
Another issue to be considered in this area is that of leniency. It is
important to enable all company officials (natural persons) involved in
breaching the competition policy to be prosecuted for criminal liabili-
ty. Leniency should also be offered to legal entities (corporate lenien-
cy). An efficient leniency policy can provide incentives for them (both
individuals and legal entities) to turn themselves in and to provide vital
insider information, i.e. testimony regarding the criminal offenses and
breaches of the competition law they were involved in. 
The EU has recently issued a revised leniency notice under which
immunity from fines, or reduced fines are granted to companies in car-
tels that bring abuses to the attention of the competition authorities.
This is generally considered to be an effective approach. Accordingly,
Yugoslav/Serbian competition policy, i.e. competition law enforce-
ment should also (alongside leniency provisions for natural persons)
provide for leniency granted to companies (legal entities). 
14.4. Methods for achieving strong deterrent effect of the
sanctions
Strong deterrent effect is essential for general prevention in the field
of competition policy legislation. There are a few cornerstones for
building strong deterrent effect of the sanctions. 
There should be stringent criminal liability/punishment for compa-
ny executives only in the case of H1 horizontal agreements, i.e. most
hard-core abuses. That will enable competition and judicial authorities
to focus their efforts on these offenses. Such an attitude will increase
the probability of convictions for the offenders and decrease business
uncertainty for all other subjects of the law. The increased probability
of conviction together with severe sanctions will create a strong deter-
rent effect. 
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The crucial cornerstone in building a strong deterrent effect is severe
fines for companies (undertakings). It is evident that deterrent effects
in the EU is built only on the character of civil sanction and the level of
fines. Again the probability of conviction is essential as is a sufficiently
high level of fines. A strong deterrent effect in FR Yugoslavia/Serbia can
be created only by demonstrating the commitment of the competition
and judicial authorities to pursue a stringent sanctions policy. The
demonstration effect can be more convincing if the first cases of con-
viction are of big and powerful firms. That will demonstrate two
things: (a) that competition legislation enforcement is independent
from partisan politics; (b) that competition and judicial authorities are
committed to the enforcement and courageous in that enforcement.
When the big and powerful are convicted, all smaller and less powerful
no longer feel comfortable. 
Fines for not acting, failure to notify, for example, could be incentive
based. i.e. the parties should have incentives in the structure of these
fines to act in line with the provisions of the competition law. For
example, the fines for failure to notify a merger could be per day fines,
where the number of days is calculated between the day of the merger
and the day the failure to notify the merger is detected. That can pro-
vide an incentive to the parties to notify the merger, even after it has
occurred. 
Increased probability of conviction in both non-criminal and crimi-
nal cases, i.e. an efficient competition authority and courts, is a prereq-
uisite for a strong deterrent effect. It has been demonstrated in many
cases that a stringent punishment policy, i.e. sever punishments that
can be passed are not effective if the probability of conviction is very
low. The crucial factor of the probability of conviction is probability of
detection of breaches of the competition legislation. That is particular-
ly significant in the case of H1 horizontal agreements/offenses. In other
words, increased probability of detection will improve probability of
conviction and create a strong deterrent effect. 
The strong deterrent effect is also linked to a sound leniency policy.
On the one hand, the leniency policy can be effective only if the possi-
ble sanctions are severe, i.e. if at least one component of deterrence is
fulfilled. On the other hand, an efficient leniency policy will enable the
competition authority to detect more breaches of the competition law
and thus to increase the probability of conviction that will provide a
stronger deterrent effect. 
An important segment of creating a strong deterrent effect is building
the reputation of the competition authority as a capable and effective
institution, able to detect and swiftly process all breaches of competition
legislation. Nonetheless, it is not enough that such an institution be
built. It is of equal importance to build the image of such an institution
in the public, i.e. public perception of the competition authority must
be the perception of a competent and efficient institution. 
Together with building the reputation of the competition authority,
the reputation of the courts regarding competition law cases should
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also be improved for a strong deterrent effect. This is very important
because, to date, the courts have very limited experience in the enforce-
ment of competition legislation. A good starting point for this is that it
will be specialized commercial courts that will be involved as the sec-
ond instance in the cases of the competition law, so the institution
building process in the case of the judiciary can be more focused. 
15. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1)  STRUCTURE OF THE COMPETITION
AUTHORITY
15.1. Level of the competition authority 
There are only two possibilities as to the level of the competition
authority: (con)federal competition authority or two republics com-
petition authorities.
a. Option A: (Con)federal competition authority, which will take
into account a single market of Serbia & Montenegro. The major
advantage of this option is: (1) Consistent solution: one (single)
market  one competition authority. Drawbacks of this option
are: (1) Single market of Serbia & Montenegro does not exist and
it is highly uncertain if and when it will be created; (2)
Competition policy will be effectively used for enforcement of the
single market (against barriers to trade between the Republics),
not for perusing economic efficiency as the main goal; (3)
Problems regarding institution building, since it is still highly
uncertain (although room for optimism is limited) how the new
(con)federation administration will operate, particularly in the
decision-making process for institution-building. 
b. Option B: The Serbian competition authority that will take into
account Serbian market only and firms from Montenegro will be
taken into account only as firms (undertakings) from all other
countries. Advantages and drawbacks of this option are inverse to
the Option A, with the major advantage of Option B being: (1)
Clear regarding the adoption of the legislation and institution
building. 
Recommendation: The process of designing new legislation and
institution building should at the beginning be at the Serbian level with
the possibility of upgrading it to the (con)federal level. With two
republican competition authorities it is very important to have a single
institution that will deal with the EC regarding competition policy/leg-
islation within the SAP. That institution should be a (con)federal
European integration office. 
15.2. The character and structure of the competition authority 
It is the paramount that competition authority operations are inde-
pendent from politics, partisan politics and public choice pressures on
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the authority. Although there is no institutional arrangement that is
absolutely safe regarding the political pressures, some of the institu-
tional arrangements provide more safeguards regarding the independ-
ent operations of the competition authority. The most important is
that the competition authority should be independent from the execu-
tive branch of the government. 
Accordingly, the proposed competition authority should be an inde-
pendent authority; i.e. a body independent from the government. Its
operations should be monitored by the National Parliament and the
public. Responsibilities (obligations) of the competition authority
towards the Parliament and the public (annual reports, public hear-
ings, etc.) should be specified in the Competition Law. 
The competition authority should comprise three branches (sectors)
with difference tasks/operations:
 Competition authority general secretariat;
 Competition authority office;
 Competition authority commission. 
The Competition authority should be under control of the President
of the Competition authority and he/she (as well as general secretariat)
will not be directly involved in law enforcement, but will monitor all
the activities of the competition authority (including law enforce-
ment). Furthermore, the President and general secretariat will be
directly involved in the activities of advocacy and education (competi-
tion culture). The major incentive for the president and the general
secretariat of the competition authority to be effective in advocacy and
education is that the more efficient the advocacy and the more compet-
itive the environment, so the greater the reductions in law enforcement
activities, and the less the need for monitoring of those activities of two
other sectors of the authority. The President will be elected (appointed)
by the Parliament, and he will be in charge of overall competition
authorities operations. 
The Competition authority Office will be an investigative body
(quasi-prosecution) that will file cases of breaches in the competition
law. The Office will be under operational control of the Vice President
of the competition authority and the head of the Office. It will have the
right to start investigations ex officio, or to process complaints filed by
the third parties. All the cases will be filed to the competition authority
Commission. The incentive for the Office is linked to the success in fil-
ing the cases before the Commission. The Office will select the cases
very carefully, bring only cases that can be won, i.e. clear cases of
breaches in the competition law. The Office will think twice before fil-
ing dubious cases, so that will be an incentive for them to prepare cases
well or to drop them altogether. This will improve the efficiency of the
Offices activities. The Vice President and the head of the Office will
also be elected (appointed) by the Parliament. 
The Competition authority Commission will be the decision-mak-
ing body (quasi-judicial body) that will make first instance decisions
on cases of breaches in the competition law filed by the Office. The
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Commission will be under operational control of the other Vice
President of the competition authority and the head of the
Commission (Chief Commissioner). The Commission will comprise
seven members: a Chief Commissioner and six Commissioners. deci-
sions should be reached by majority vote of all seven Commissioners
(four votes for a decision to be made). In the decision-making process
the Chief Commissioner will be only the first among equals. The incen-
tive for the Commission to be efficient in their decisions is that each
decision can be challenged by the court  commissioners will definitely
not like the majority of their decisions to be reversed by the courts. The
Vice President and the head of the Commission will also be elected
(appointed) by the parliament. There will be no second instance with-
in the competition authority, i.e. all appeals will go to the courts. 
All three heads of the departments will be appointed by the
Parliament, so they will be accountable for the operations of their
departments/sectors of the Competition authority. 
15.3. Nomination, election and recall of the decision-makers
As already pointed out, the President of the Competition Authority,
two Vice Presidents and all Commissionaires should be
elected/appointed by the Parliament. The President, Vice Presidents
and Commissioners should be appointed for fixed terms. The presi-
dent should be appointed for six years, a vice president in charge of the
Office for five years and the Vice president in charge of the
Commission (chief commissioner) for seven years. All commissioners
should be appointed for fixed terms, but the terms should be different
for each commissioner, staring with two years ending with seven years
(Chief Commissioner). There should be a statutory limit for each offi-
cial of one consecutive term in the authority.  
All of them should be nominated to the parliament by the
Government, i.e. by the Cabinet of Ministers. There is no need for
separate nominations because that could create a vested interest link
(for example nominations by the chamber of commerce, trade
unions). There should be some strong constrains regarding the nomi-
nation/appointment. The appointed officials should have no conflict
of interest whatsoever, and that should be provided for in the compe-
tition law. Furthermore some requirements regarding professional
background should be specified in the legislation (economists and
lawyers, for example). 
The process of recalling/dismissal (removal from the office) should
be specified very precisely and an exhaustive list of reasons for recall-
ing/dismissal should be specified by the Competition Law. The list
should include the acts (deeds) that damage the reputation of the com-
petition authority (office or commission), such as serious criminal
offenses by an official, should not offer any legal grounds whatsoever
for recalling/dismissal on the decision of the Commission. It is essen-
tial to provide legal safeguards of this kind, because this is the only
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mechanism that will enable the independent operation of the competi-
tion authority, i.e. prevent government influence on the authoritys
operations and decisions. 
15.4. Funding of the competition authority operations 
Several important principles regarding the funding of competition
authority operations, should be pointed out:
 There are substantial initial (fixed) costs for the competition
authority, i.e. costs of building that authority; 
 There is a need for regular funding of the operations of the com-
petition authority; 
 Regular funding of the competition authority operations must
not be influenced by governments satisfaction/dissatisfaction by
specific decisions and rulings of the competition authority. 
In principle, there are three ways to fund the competition authority
building and operations: 
a. Option A: Budgetary funding of the competition authority; 
b. Option B: Funding from fees paid by the parties;
c. Option C: Funding from foreign donations (grants).
Budgetary funding is the only way to secure regular funding of the
competition authority and to provide the basis for financial planning
within the competition authority. Nonetheless, there is a great danger
that the government will use that leverage to influence the decisions of
the authority, i.e. to violate the authoritys independence by conditional-
ity imposed on the disbursement of financial resources from the budget.
Accordingly, there must be a budgetary planning and disbursement pro-
cedure that will safeguard the independence of this regulatory authority. 
Fees should be levied from the parties dealing with the competition
commission, for example fees for the (merger and agreements) notifi-
cation and fees for filing the case before the authority (office). These
fees would generate a certain amount of money for the competition
authority, and that money should remain with the authority, being
allocated to its capital budget (i.e. it should be used for capital expendi-
tures only). Whatever the unit fee, the total amount of money generat-
ed by fees cannot be the only source of funding for the operations of
the competition authority, because it is very difficult to envisage rev-
enues based on fees. 
The amount of fees should be set as a deterrent for ridiculous cases
to be filed before the competition authoritys office. It is obvious that
the administrative capacity of the competition authority at the begin-
ning will be rather limited, hence its burden to the authority should be
minimized. That is why the amount of fees for merger notification
should be lower than the amount of fees for agreements notification.
Taking all these considerations into account, it is quite realistic that the
expected revenue stream based on the fees would be rather small. 
Foreign donations (grants) could be a source of funding, but only
for institution building costs, not for operative costs. Furthermore, a
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detailed blueprint for institution building must be made, to persuade
foreign donors that grants will be used effectively, i.e. that new institu-
tions will become effective in due course. 
Revenues from fines for breaching competition law should be allo-
cated straight to the budget, and no single portion of these should be
allocated to the competition authority. The reason for such a recom-
mendation is that otherwise there will be a substantial conflict of inter-
est of decision-markers within the authority, i.e. decisions will be
biased because there will be a vested interest of the decision-maker (the
Commission of the competition authority) to increase the total
amount of revenues based on the fines ceteris paribus. 
15.5. Legal powers of the competition authority 
The legal powers of the competition authority should be divided
between the legal powers of the competition authority Office and the
legal powers of the competition authority Commission. 
As to the Office, it is extremely important that the Office should
have the legal power of collecting all relevant data/information from
the subjects of the law, irrespective of whether the case has been trig-
gered ex officio or by the complaint of a private party. On the other
hand, there must be a legal obligation of the office regarding confiden-
tiality of the data collected in that way. Furthermore, there must be a
legal obligation for all relevant government institutions (for example
Statistical Office, Security Exchange Commission, etc.) to provide all
relevant data and information to the authority. 
As to the Commission, its legal power should be to proclaim law-
breaching agreements null and void and to impose fines. 
As to the general secretariat, there should be a legal provision that will
provide a legal power for the secretariat to be involved in consultations
in preparations of all new policies and legislation. Furthermore, the gen-
eral secretariat should have the legal power to initiate review of any exist-
ing policy and legislation relevant for competition policy. Nonetheless,
general secretariat should not have any power to veto any other
policy/legislation however relevant it is for the competition policy. 
16. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (2)  OPERATIONS OF THE
COMPETITION AUTHORITY
16.1. Procedural rules of the competition authority 
There should be two types of procedural rules of the competition
authority:
 procedural rules strictu senso; 
 substantive rules. 
Procedural rules strictu senso shall specify precisely all the proce-
dures that will be used in all the cases and segments of the decision-
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making process within the competition authority. These procedures
should be formal/written to minimize the room for abusing competi-
tion legislation enforcement.
The substantive rule should provide basic criteria for the competi-
tion authority decision-making. These criteria should enable clear and
unambiguous decision on issues such as what is a relevant market,
whether some legal entity has a dominant position, whether the abuse
of the dominant position is exploitative or exclusionary, etc. 
Both types of rules should be specified by sub-statutory texts
(decrees, bylaws, guidelines, etc.), according to the legal provision pro-
vided in the statutory text  the Competition Law. All the rules should
be made public; published in the Official Gazette before becoming
effective and be available from the competition authority at any time,
free of charge, in both printed and electronic versions. 
16.2. Providing public information 
It is very important that the competition authority provides infor-
mation to the public regarding its legislation enforcement activities.
This should include:
 Publishing all the decisions in the Official Gazette. 
 Create a website with all relevant legislative texts (statutory and
sub-statutory) and all other legal documents. 
 Provide accurate website information with the status of all cases. 
 Provide website information on the competition authority (com-
mission) decisions on all cases. 
 Guidelines for the notification (with forms) for mergers and
agreements.
 Guidelines for filing complaints (cases) to the competition
authority (office). 
Providing public information is very important in the other segment
of the competition authority activities  advocacy. Efficient advocacy
crucially depends on provision of relevant information on the
actual/proposed competition policy and the effects of other actual/pro-
posed policies relevant for competition, i.e. policies that have an
impact on the competitiveness of the market structures. 
Creating good public relations of the competition authority is a pre-
requisite for effective advocacy. Furthermore it is one of the prerequi-
sites (necessary, but not sufficient condition) for building the reputa-
tion of the competition authority. 
16.3. Public debate 
The decision-making process should be public in certain instances.
Formal decision-making sessions of the commission of the competi-
tion authority (as quasi-judicial body) should be public. The public
should have an opportunity to monitor and contribute to the deci-
sion-making process in which each party/concern should have the
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right to make its case (for example, the office as quasi-prosecutor and
the party that is prosecuted). Transcripts from all the sessions should
be available in electronic form. Special attention should be made to
protect confidential data (legitimate business secrets) of the con-
cerned parties. 
17. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
The role of judicially in enforcement of competition legislation is
basically twofold:
 The role of the specialized (commercial) courts in the process of
judicial revew. 
 The role of general courts in criminal prosecutions. 
In both cases institutional structures exist, the only short-term
improvement that can be expected is linked to the training of judges
both regarding the basics of the competition policy and regarding the
recent development on competition policy/legislation, i.e. to enable
them to enforce this legislation efficiently. 
18. BLUEPRINT FOR COMPETITION INSTITUTION BUILDING
18.1. Time frame for institution building
The initial stage of institution building of the new Yugoslav/Serbian
competition authority will be three years. This initial stage can be
divided into two periods:
 period of the short-term activities (the first year);
 period of the medium-term activities (the next two years). 
The first year activities are crucial for the institutional development
of the competition authority. If the right activities are performed in the
right way during the first 12 months, a solid foundation is developed
for further institution building of the competition authority. On the
contrary, if the short-term institutional development is done in the
wrong way, a lot of resources will have to be allocated to correct the
mistakes and to, in that way, provide a solid basis for further develop-
ment. That is why it has been decided that the following blueprint
should focus only on the first, crucial year of the institution building of
the competition authority. 
Furthermore, a blueprint for medium-term activities, i.e. the activi-
ties of the second and third year of the institution building process can
be specified only when the results of the first year activities are known
and have been analyzed. In other words, it makes no sense to specify
the medium-term activities before the short-term activities have even
started to be implemented. 
As to the political constellation and constitutional set-up, it can be
expected that the new common state of Serbia & Montenegro will be
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operational in the first quarter of 2003. According to the political
agreement, the existing Federal structures will cease to exist at the end
of January 2003, although there are some possibilities for this cut-off
date to be postponed. According to the institution building plan for the
new common state of Serbia & Montenegro, there is no plan whatsoev-
er for building a (con)federal competition authority  a rather clear
signal that competition policy has already been allocated to the mem-
ber states. Accordingly, if there is no dramatic political change, the new
competition legislation will be passed and adopted in the Serbian
Parliament and the new competition authority will be developed at the
Serbian level, i.e. will take care of the Serbian market only. 
Since the Draft of the new Competition Law was submitted to the
Serbian Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations before the end of
2002, it can be expected that the Cabinet of Ministers (the Serbian
Government) will adopt the Draft, and the Competition Law Bill will
reach the Parliament and be enacted/adopted in the first quarter of
2003. The new Competition Law will provide a legal basis for the new
competition authority to be built. 
The final Article of the Draft Competition Law stipulates that the
Law shall enter into force on the eighth day following the day of its
publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, and the
first day of its enforcement shall be January 1st, 2004, except for the
provisions on the establishment of the competition authority which
shall be enforced from the day on which the Law enters into force. This
provision of the Law gives enough time for the institution building
process, before the new legislation is enforced. 
One of the most urgent jobs in the institution building process is
enabling the competition authority to start its operations and to
enforce effectively the competition legislation. The crucial prerequisite
for that is developing the sub-statutory legal documents that will
enable the competition authority to enforce the Competition Law. 
18.2. Development of legal documents
There are two groups of legal documents that must be developed in
a short time: (1) the By-laws, i.e. the Statue of the competition author-
ity; and (2) the Guidelines for the procedures and decision-making
process within the competition authority. 
18.2.1. By laws (Statute of competition authority)
Drafting and adopting the Statute of the competition authority, as a
crucial By-law, will enable the authority to be built, to provide a divi-
sion of labor (powers and responsibilities) within the authority, and to
provide the groundwork for authority operations. Furthermore, the
Statute will provide the detailed procedure for establishing relations
between the competition authority and the parties. The Statute of the
competition authority will cover all activities of the authority specified
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by the Competition law: legislation enforcement, advocacy and educa-
tion  competition culture. 
This is most urgent job to be done  the Statute is the very first legal
document that should be adopted after the authority has been formally
established (strictly speaking formal decision on establishing the
authority should be made simultaneously with the adoption of the
Statute of the competition authority). Accordingly, the draft of the By-
law, i.e. the Statute of the competition authority should be prepared
within 3 months after the legislation has been adopted. 
18.2.2. Guidelines
There are three sets of guidelines that must be developed, enabling
the Competition Authority to enforce the law: 
a. Guidelines for merger control investigation and decision-making
are the most important guidelines because there is no experience
whatsoever in enforcing merger control in Serbia. These guide-
lines should include detailed specifications on the process of
market definition (particularly geographic market and product
substitutability) as well as procedures to identify barriers to
entry, potential competitors and countervailing strength of cus-
tomers/buyers. All these procedures are of the utmost impor-
tance because the mergers will be challenged on the grounds of
creating and strengthening dominant position. The guidelines
should also provide clear specification of the merger notification
process, including the draft notification forms that will be used in
the compulsory merger notification process. 
b. Guidelines for abuse of dominant position investigation and deci-
sion-making are also very important, because it can be assumed
that there are many cases of dominant position in the Serbian
economy. These guidelines should include all market definition
issues already mentioned in the previous guidelines (crucial for
identification of dominant position on the market). Apart from
that the guidelines should also include procedures for detection of
the abuses of dominant position, both in cases of exploitative and
exclusionary abuses. Special attention should be paid to the
process of identification of non-cost based pricing (including
appropriate definition of the types of costs) and price discrimina-
tion. The identification process for other forms of abuses of dom-
inant position should also be specified. 
c. To provide Guidelines for restrictive agreements investigation and
decision-making. These guidelines will include procedures for
detecting the H1 group of horizontal agreements that are per se
prohibited, as well as the procedures for evaluation of H2 horizon-
tal and V (vertical) agreements to which the legal standard of the
rule of reason will be applied. The guidelines will also provide
guidelines for the notification process, including the draft notifica-
tion forms that will be used in the voluntary notification process. 
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All of the guidelines are necessary for the legislation enforcement.
Accordingly, all of the guidelines should be prepared within 6 months
after the legislation has been adopted. 
18.3. Staffing and Recruiting 
The staffing of the competition authority is essential for its effective
and efficient operations. This is of paramount importance, particularly
taking into account the lack of skilled and experienced personnel. 
Total employment of the competition authority at the end of the
2003 should be about 45 people. It is estimated that this staff would be
sufficient for the initial operations of the authority. There should be
internal division of the staff in line with the organizational structure of
the competition authority. Accordingly, the total target employment
should be divided into sectoral targets: 
a. General Secretariat  8 employees;
b. Office  25 employees;
c. Commission  12 (including Commissionaires). 
General Secretariat is in charge of monitoring overall operations of
the competition authority and particularly in charge of advocacy and
competition culture development, as well as developing authoritys
public relations. Since advocacy and building PR should start as soon
as possible, it is essential that General Secretariat get its entire staff
within the first six months from the establishment of the competition
authority. 
The main operations of the Office are investigations  a very time
consuming activity. Accordingly, the Office is, in terms of employees,
the biggest sector of the competition authority (more that 50% of its
the whole staff). There should be some specialization within investiga-
tions, at least to the three major cases that the competition authority
will deal with: (1) mergers review; (2) abuse of dominant position; and
(3) restrictive agreements. Such a specialization would increase the
efficiency of investigations, i.e. will foster efficient operations of the
Office. Furthermore, additional specialization is recommended in
terms of the specialization within trades (economic and legal expert-
ise). For example, economists should specialize in: industrial organiza-
tion (economics), accounting, corporate finance, etc. 
Finally, apart from the Commissioners, the Commission should
employ a limited number of non-elected (non-appointed) civil ser-
vants, i.e. officials that would provide support to the Commissioners in
their decision-making activities. There is no need for many of them, so
as to the number of civil servants, the Commission is planned to be the
smallest sector of the competition authority. 
As to the steps of staffing and recruitment, the first step should be
election/appointment of the key personnel, i.e. top executives in charge
of the competition authority and its sectors: the President and two Vice
Presidents of the competition authority. These executives should be the
champions of the competition authority institution building project.
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The sooner these three executives are appointed, the better regarding
the institution building project. It would be beneficial, although not
obligatory, to appoint all the Commissioners simultaneously.
Nonetheless, if that appointment will delay the appointment of the
three chief executives, the Commissioners apart from the Chief
Commissioner (Vice President) should be appointed separately. 
Civil servants should be selected and recruited form the staff of the
existing competition authority, experts in the relevant fields of eco-
nomics and law out of the Government (including universities), local
university graduates, as well as Serbian graduates from Western uni-
versities willing to return home. Not all of the people from the existing
competition authority (Antimonopolska komisija) should be
employed automatically at the new competition authority, some selec-
tions should take place. 
Apart from the full-time employees (civil servants), the competition
authority should develop a network of experts/consultants (predomi-
nantly economists and lawyers) that are outside the competition
authority (university professors, think-tanks and institutes, consulting
companies, etc.) who will provide the authority with relevant expertise.
Two networks of that kind should be developed. One of the regular
consultants, i.e. for regular and general kind of consultancy and the
other of ad hoc consultants, i.e. for consultancy that is likely to take
place in the case of some specific industries. 
18.4. Training
Skills needed for the activities of the competition authority are
rather scarce in Serbia, hence a good training program for all the
employees is of the paramount importance for institution building and
for efficient operations of the authority. The training courses should be
flexible to accommodate all the employees but they should have the
same core, i.e. some essential economic and legal knowledge indispen-
sable for each employee of the competition authority. 
There should be an individual training program for each employee
of the competition authority. Individual benchmarks for the training
progress should be established, together will incentives for each indi-
vidual to meet these benchmarks. It must be clear for each employee
that his/her professional career is in question if the benchmarks are not
met. The President and two Vice Presidents should be in charge of the
individual training program and its implementation. 
Training courses should be organized together with supranational
competition authorities (like the EC DG COMPET, for example) and
big and successful national competition authorities (like US DOJ and
FTC). The EC/EU training link is very important, taking into account
the SAP as well as available funds for covering the costs of the training.
Since the US competition authorities (DOJ and FTC) have already
established specialized training courses it is equally important that the
competition authority staff to participate at these courses. 
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Strong and regular links should be established with the relevant
competition authority of the transitional countries. A segment of these
links should be regular exchange of personnel, enabling exchange of
experience. Since other transitional countries, particularly Poland and
Hungary are much more experienced in enforcement of competition
policy, these exchanges will effectively constitute training of the com-
petition authority staff. The Hungarian competition authority is par-
ticularly important. The first reason being that the organizational
scheme of the Hungarian competition authority is very similar to the
designed organizational scheme of the domestic authority. The second
reason is that Hungary is (alongside Poland) one of the transitional
economies with the best track record regarding competition policy.
Furthermore, officials of the Hungarian competition authority have
already indicated that they are willing to collaborate with their Serbian
counterparts. Finally, collaboration with Hungarian counterparts, due
to the geographical proximity, will generate only reasonable costs
(transportation costs, etc.) 
A very important part of the training of the executives and other
officials of the competition authority is active participation in activities
of the International Competition Network (hereafter ICN). This net-
work was established in September 2002 (the Naples Conference) and
has a number of very active working groups on various topics highly
relevant for competition policy. The main objective of these activities is
international standardization, in terms of identification of the best
practice of competition authorities the world over. 
18.5. Public relations and early advocacy
Developing good public relations (PR) and early advocacy (includ-
ing development of the competition culture) should be the priorities of
the competition authority even before the authority starts to enforce
the competition legislation. 
Good public relations of the competition authority should help the
authority to create the image of a committed, efficient and unbiased
authority. This will enable the authority to create alliances with stake-
holders, particularly with consumers and their associations. These
alliances will enhance the power of the competition authority and cre-
ate an environment for its efficient operations. 
The first activity in the field of PR and competition culture should be
writing and publishing a monograph (book) The Commentary of the
Competition Law that will consist of all pieces of legislation (both
statutory and sub-statutory texts) with relevant comments on these
pieces as well as notification forms. The book will be a User Manual for
competition legislation and competition policy, and should be only the
first step in the publishing activities of the competition authority or on
the behalf of the competition authority. 
From the first year of its operations the competition authority
should publish the annual report with all relevant information on
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the authoritys activities during the year, including a balance sheet
and income statements. The annual report should be published in
both Serbian and English, distributed free of charge and should be
available for downloading in electronic form from the authoritys
web site. 
In terms of developing competition culture, there is a need for other
publications about competition policy/legislation, its aims and origins.
Apart from domestic publications, these publications should include
translations of EC publications regarding the common competition
policy of EU member states. 
Another important move regarding PR is designing the competition
authority web site with active communication with all parties and
stakeholders. The site should contain all the relevant information on
competition policy/legislation and information on the current activi-
ties of the competition authority including: relevant legal documents,
annual reports, review of all the cases, rulings/decisions of the authori-
ty, electronic copies of application forms, etc. The site should be multi-
lingual (bilingual for the beginning, Serbian and English). The site
should be interactive provide incentives for two-way communication
between the parties and the competition authority. 
A PR campaign should be launched at some point during the first
year of the competition authority. Timing and the content of this oper-
ation should be selected by the PR consultants of the competition
authority. The aim of the campaign would be to let the public know
about the new authority, about the new policy/legislation (competition
policy) and what the major benefits of implementation of the policy
are. The PR campaign will help the authority to build alliances as well
as to recruit personnel. 
Regular contact of the competition authority with other government
bodies (Statistical Office, Security Exchange Commission) should be
established in the early stages of institutional building. Such regular
contact is important as a platform for sharing all relevant information,
hence it is very important to specify lines and methods of easy commu-
nication at the very beginning. It is important to establish mutual trust
between government bodies. 
18.6. Costs and funding 
It is not feasible to specify the total costs of the first year of operation
of the competition authority because it is still uncertain what the pace
of the institutional development will be. As to the initial costs, two of
them are substantial.
The first one is getting new premises for the competition authority.
It is not so important whether the new premises will the owner occu-
pied or rented. It is very important, however, that the new premises are
not a government property , because renting the premises to the
authority can constitute leverage for the Government to exercise influ-
ence over the authoritys operations. 
88 New Competition Policy: A Policy Paper
The second initial cost is establishing a solid IT foundation (both in
terms of hardware and software) and establishing links with all relevant
IT links/networks. Creation of specific data bases should also be con-
sidered as initial IT cost. Furthermore, the costs of developing a
resource library and subscription to all electronic documents should be
added to this group of costs. 
As to the operational costs, the labor costs of the competition
authority will be substantial, i.e. rather high wages of the employees
are envisaged. There are some good reasons for the high wages of the
competition authority employees. Among them, the first is the oppor-
tunity for recruitment of high-quality people for the competition
authority. The second one is that high wages provide a substantial
(although not impenetrable) barrier against corruption, i.e. against
biased decisions of the competition authority and abuse of competi-
tion policy by competitors. 
As to the funding, institution building and the operations of the
competition authority should be funded from the budget and foreign
grants (donations). It is expected that all operational costs, or at least
the major part of them, will be funded from the budget. Since the
Serbian budget for 2003 has already been adopted by the Parliament,
there is a need for budget restructuring during the year. Since many
authorities will be moved from the existing Federal to the Serbian level,
the budget restructuring can be expected one way or the other, i.e. it is
not only the new competition authority that will trigger such budgetary
restructuring. 
Foreign grants (donations) can be expected as one-off payments (or
in-kind contributions) for covering some of the initial costs of institu-
tion building. Foreign donors should be approached by the champions
of the competition authority institution-building project as soon as
possible to evaluate the prospects for donations of this kind. 
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